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I. INTRODUCTION
In Troxel v. Granville, in 2000,2 four United States Supreme Court
Justices determined that "[t]he liberty interest[s] ... of parents in the care,
custody, and control of their children" (herein childcare interests) generally
foreclose states from compelling grandparent childcare over parental objec-
tions.3 Yet, these four recognized that "special factors" might justify judi-
1. Professor Emeritus, Northern Illinois University College of Law. B.A., Colby
College, J.D., The University of Chicago. Special thanks to the Library Staff at the NIU
College of Law and to Zach Townsend, Robin Babcox-Poole, Meg Hogan, and Will Boyles
for their excellent research assistance. All errors and omission remain mine.
2. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
3. Id. at 65 (Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer [hereinafter plurality opinion]) ("[P]erhaps the oldest of the fundamen-
tal liberty interests recognized by this Court."); id. at 68-69 ("[S]o long as a parent adequate-
ly cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to
inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to
make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent's children."). On analyzing
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cial interference as long as a parent's contrary wishes on visitation were
accorded "at least some special weight."4 The plurality opinion and one
concurring Justice reserved the question of whether any "nonparental visita-
tion" must "include a showing of harm or potential harm to the child." 5 The
concurring Justice hinted, however, that at least some nonparental visitation
could be based solely on a preexisting "substantial relationship" between a
child and a nonparent and on "the State's particular best-interests stand-
ard."
6
A dissenter, not unlike the concurrer, observed that a best-interests
standard might be constitutional where the nonparent acted "in a caregiving
role over a significant period of time," 7 hinting that such a nonparent might
even be afforded "de facto" parent status.8 A second dissenter seemingly
agreed, noting the need for both "gradations" of nonparents 9 and carefully
crafted state law definitions of parents.1° A third dissenter added that be-
cause at least some children in nonparent visitation settings likely "have
plurality opinions, see Donald Leo Bach, The Rapanos Rap: Grappling with Plurality Deci-
sions, 81 U.S.L.W. 468 (2012).
4. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 70 (plurality opinion) ("[I]f a fit parent's decision of the
kind at issue here becomes subject to judicial review, the court must accord at least some
special weight to the parent's own determination.").
5. Id. at 73 (plurality opinion) ("[W]e do not consider.., whether the Due Process
Clause requires all nonparental visitation statutes to include a showing of harm or potential
harm to the child as a condition precedent to granting [nonparent] visitation."); id. at 77.
(Souter, J., concurring) ("[T]here is no need to decide whether harm is required.").
6. Id. at 76-77 (Souter, J., concurring) (while not every nonparent should be capa-
ble of securing visitation upon demonstrating a child's best interests, perhaps a nonparent
who establishes "that he or she has a substantial relationship with the child" should be able
to petition if the state chooses). An exemplary statute is Virginia Code 20-124.2B. See VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-124.2(B) (2008) ("The court shall give due regard to the primacy of the
parent-child relationship[,] but may[,] upon a showing by clear and convincing evidence that
the best interest of the child would be served[,] thereby award custody or visitation to any
other person with a legitimate interest."). An illustrative case is In re M W., No. 12CA0771,
2012 WL 4464386 (Colo. App. Sept. 27, 2012) (employing C.R.S.A. § 14-10-123).
7. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 98-99 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Cases are sure to arise ...
in which a third party, by acting in a caregiving role over a significant period of time, has
developed a relationship with a child which is not necessarily subject to absolute parental
veto .... In the design and elaboration of their visitation laws, States may be entitled to
consider that certain relationships are such that to avoid the risk of harm, a best interests
standard can be employed by their domestic relations courts in some circumstances.").
8. Id. at 100-01 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[A] fit parent's right vis-A-vis a com-
plete stranger is one thing; her right vis-A-vis another parent or a de facto parent may be
another.").
9. Id. at 92-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Judicial vindications of 'parental rights' ...
requires ... judicially defined gradations of other persons (grandparents, extended family,
adoptive family in an adoption later found to be invalid, long-term guardians, etc.) who may
have some claim against the wishes of the parents.").
10. Id. ("Judicial vindication of 'parental rights' . . . requires... a judicially crafted
definition of parents .... ").
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fundamental liberty interests in preserving" "established familial or family-
like bonds,""1 nonparents seeking childcare must be distinguished by
whether there is a "presence or absence of some embodiment of family."'
12
So, while important, parental objections to nonparental childcare (in-
cluding both visitation and custody) are not always dispositive. 13 Since
Troxel, the U.S. Supreme Court has said little about nonparent childcare,
including the weight of special factors, de facto parents, children's funda-
mental liberty interests, and family-like bonds. 14 While some state legisla-
tures since Troxel have extensively refined their grandparent visitation
laws,15 many have not fully addressed the childcare interests of other non-
11. Id. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But see Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S.
110, 129 (1989) (the Court has not "had occasion to decide whether a child has a liberty
interest, symmetrical with that of her parent, in maintaining her filial relationship"); In re
Meridian H., 798 N.W.2d 96 (Neb. 2011) (no recognition of a federal or state constitutional
right to continuing sibling relationships with a sister upon the termination of parental rights
regarding the sister, where the sister was placed in foster care and the two older siblings
were adopted); Jill Elaine Hasday, Siblings in Law, 65 VAND. L. REV. 897 (2012) (urging
courts, legislatures, and scholars pay better attention to "sibling relationships," concluding:
"[f]amily law's narrow focus on marriage and parenthood, inherited from the common law
and then endlessly replicated without normative scrutiny, has constrained critical thinking in
family law for too long").
12. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
13. Comparably, one parent's objection to placement for adoption is not always
dispositive when the other parent agrees and placement clearly and convincingly serves the
child's best interests. See, e.g., In re C.L.O., 41 A.3d 502 (D.C. 2012).
14. One distinguished commentator said about Troxel:
Troxel did more to confuse than clarify the law in the area of grandpar-
ents' rights laws. On the one hand, the case can be read broadly as reaf-
firming that parents have a fundamental right to control the upbringing
of their children and as providing a basis for invalidating orders for
grandparent visitation over the objection of fit parents. On the other
hand, Troxel can be read as a very narrow decision that involved a par-
ticularly broad law applied in a situation where the parent was fit and
regular grandparent visitation still occurred. The absence of a majority
opinion makes it even more difficult to assess the impact of the decision
other than the certainty that it will lead to challenges to grandparents'
rights laws throughout the country.
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 833 (Wolters
Kluwer ed., 4th ed. 2011).
15. The Illinois judicial and legislative response to Troxel is described in Michael
A. Goldberg, Over the River and Through the Woods-Again: The New Illinois Grandparent
Visitation Act, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 403 (2005) (reviewing other American state responses to
Troxel). Grandparent visitation statutes are listed in Robyn L. Ginsberg, Comment, Grand-
parents' Visitation Rights: The Constitutionality of New York's Domestic Relations Law
Section 72 After Troxel v. Granville, 65 ALB. L. REV. 205, 205 n.2 (2001), while the post-
Troxel state cases on the constitutionality of such statutes are reviewed in Sonya C. Garza,
The Troxel Aftermath: A Proposed Solution for State Courts and Legislatures, 69 LA. L.
REv. 927 (2009).
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parents or the children's interests in preserving family-like bonds, 16 be it via
"gradations" of nonparents or new forms of parenthood. State legislators
and judges are thus often left to determine the import of a "caregiving role
over a significant period of time," the breadth of any "de facto" parenthood
doctrine, nonparent and parentage "gradations," and children's liberty inter-
ests. As the U.S. Supreme Court has said, the regulation of domestic rela-
tions rests within the "virtually exclusive province of the states."17 Within
this province, states may declare one to be a parent in one setting while not
a parent in another setting. 18
An urgent need for new state childcare laws has arisen due to the ris-
ing number of children who are no longer raised by their two natural or
adoptive parents in marital homes. There has been an upsurge in childcare
by cohabiting, unwed, natural mothers and fathers; by unwed, natural
mothers and their intimate partners (be they male or female); by grandpar-
ents; and solely by natural mothers.19 Thus, there are more frequent child-
16. See, e.g., Solangel Moldonado, When Father (or Mother) Doesn't Know Best:
Quasi-Parents and Parental Deference After Troxel v. Granville, 88 IOWA L. REV. 865
(2003).
17. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975). On recent federal law policies on
families and childcare, see, e.g., Helen M. Alvard, Curbing Its Enthusiasm: U.S. Federal
Policy and the Unitary Family, 2 INT'L J. JURISPRUDENCE FAM. 107 (2011).
18. See, e.g., In re C.C., 2011 IL 111795, 49 (man may be father in dissolution
proceeding, but not in a child neglect and shelter proceeding).
19. See, e.g., Stephanie L. Ventura & Christine A. Bachrach, CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 48 NATIONAL VITAL STATISTICS REPORTS No. 16: NONMARITAL
CHILDBEARING IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940-99, at 2 (Oct. 18, 2000) ("The percent of births
to unmarried women rose almost without interruption from 1940 (3.8 percent) to 1994 (32.6
percent) .... From 1994 to 1999 there was little change ... it was 33.0 percent in 1999.");
Lynn D. Wardle, Dilemmas of Indissoluble Parenthood: Legal Incentives, Parenting and the
Work-Family Balance, 26 BYU J. PUB. L. 265, 270 (2012) (increasing parenting by unwed
couples and by single parents, mostly mothers); J. Herbie DiFonzo, How Marriage Became
Optional: Cohabitation, Gender, and the Emerging Functional Norms, 8 RUTGERS J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 521, 523 (2011) (increasing parenting by single parents and relatives); U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, LIVING ARRANGEMENTS OF CHILDREN: 2009 2-4,
tbl. 1, fig. 1 (June 2011) (especially Figure 1, historical living arrangements of children,
1880-2009, and Table 1, selected 1991-2009 figures showing more and more children not
living with two married parents and living with single parent or grandparents only); Facts
About Children Being Raised by Grandparents, ILL. DEP'T OF AGING,
www.state.il.us/aging/lintergen/grgfacts.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (over 200,000
children under eighteen living in grandparent-headed households, with over 40,000 grand-
parents "responsible for their grandchildren for 5 years or more"). Increasing parenting by
grandparents and other relatives seemingly arises, in part, because of the Federal Fostering
Connections Act of 2008. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(29) (2010) ("[W]ithin thirty days after the
removal of a child from the custody of the parent or parents of the child, the state shall exer-
cise due diligence to identify and provide notice to all adult grandparents and other adult
relatives [and explain options involving kinship guardianship]."). See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78A-6-307(7), (18)(c) (LexisNexis 2012) (when a child removed from parental custody,
preference for placement of the child shall be given to "a relative of the child"). See also
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care disputes when at least some prospective caretakers have no biological
or adoptive ties with the children.2°
Since Troxel, some state courts have recognized child caretaking inter-
ests in nonbiological and nonadoptive caretakers through doctrines 2' such
as de facto parent,22 in loco parentis, 23 equitable parent, 24 equitable estop-
Judith T. Younger, Families Now: What We Don't Know Is Hurting Us, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV.
719, 722, 733 (2012) ("glaring need for reliable data" on "what is really happening in inti-
mate relationships").
20. Comparably, the rising numbers of unwed cohabitating couples has prompted
much litigation over property distribution upon separation. See, e.g., In re Kelly, 287 P.3d 12
(Wash. Ct. App. 2012) (applying equitable "committed intimate relationship" doctrine to
unwed separating couple who lived in a marital-like relationship and acquired what would
have been community property had there been a marriage). To the extent the disputes in-
volve contracts, there may be controlling statutes. See, e.g., Cavalli v. Arena, 42 A.3d 250
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2012) (new statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 25:1-5(h) (West 2012),
requires palimony pacts to be in writing and be subject to independent attorney review and
advice).
21. See, e.g., Maldonado, supra note 16, at 893-97 (demonstrating how Troxel
allows visitation/custody petitions by certain nonparents). At times, these doctrines could be
used where the nonparents have no intimate, unitary, or quasi-marital familial relationships
with one or both parents but where there are quasi-parent relationships with the children for
whom they seek custody or visitation. See, e.g., E.C. v. J.V., 136 Cal. Rptr. 3d 339 (Ct. App.
2012).
22. See, e.g., In re Custody of B.M.H., 267 P.3d 499 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011) (hold-
ing common law de facto parentage claim was available to former stepparent as long as child
had only one existing fit parent; court noted that a similar claim was made available in an
earlier case to a former same-sex female partner of a birth mother); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
403.270 (LexisNexis 2010) (statutory "de facto custodian"). Some grandparents can achieve
de facto parent status under statute. See, e.g., Guardianship of Estates of Vaughan, 207 Cal.
App. 4th 1055 (2012) (stating grandparents are de facto parents where, pursuant to Califor-
nia Family Code section 3041(c), they provide "a stable placement" of their grandchild by
"fulfilling both the child's physical needs and the child's psychological needs ... for a sub-
stantial period of time," even where the parent has not been found unfit or to have aban-
doned the child).
23. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 97 So. 3d 43 (Miss. 2012) (recognizing that in loco
parentis status, with possible visitation or custody rights, can be accorded to maternal grand-
parents "only if there has been a clear showing of abandonment, desertion, or unfitness on
the part of the parent"). But see Strauss v. Tushman, 216 P.3d 370 (Utah Ct. App. 2009)
(stating former stepfather's in loco parent status ends with divorce and mother's objection to
continued contact); Rohmiller v. Hart, 811 N.W.2d 585, 593 (Minn. 2012) (explaining a
maternal aunt could assume in loco parentis status, though not proven here). See also Glancy
v. Spradley, No. CA2012-02-024, 2012 WL 4074986 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2012) (stating
a cohabiting paramour could not be charged with domestic violence for "switching" his
mate's child as the mate concurred in the "switching" (a form of corporal punishment) and
the paramour stood "in loco parentis").
24. See, e.g., Lipnevicius v. Lipnevicius, No. 304520, 2012 WL 3318584 (Mich. Ct.
App. Aug. 14, 2012) (holding the equitable parent doctrine, adopted in Atkinson v. Atkinson,
408 N.E.2d 516 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987), cannot be used by former husband of child's mother
where his marital presumption of paternity was earlier rebutted and where the natural father
had been judicially declared the father under law).
2013]
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pel,25 and "psychological parent., 2 6 Other state courts, while often sympa-
thetic to nonbiological and nonadoptive parents, have deferred to elected
legislators in their own state's "representative democracy., 27 In fact, some
legislatures have established parenthood gradations (as with legal and equi-
table parents) or otherwise recognized childcare interests (as with parental
responsibilities and parenting time) in some with neither biological nor
adoptive ties.
In Illinois, the Troxel "liberty interests of parents" are reflected in the
"superior rights doctrine," which holds that parents have the superior right
to care for their children.28 This doctrine is incorporated into some Illinois
25. See, e.g., Juanita A. v. Kenneth N., 930 N.E.2d 214 (N.Y. 2010) (holding puta-
tive father could assert equitable estoppel defense when sued by natural mother for child
support if mother acquiesced in the development of a close relationship between the child
and another father figure and when the disruption of that relationship would be detrimental
to the child's interests); In re Comm'r of Social Servs. v. Julio J., 94 A.D.3d 606 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2012) (holding in certain circumstances, including "operative parent-child relation-
ship," equitable estoppel can bar a man from denying paternity of a nonmarital child with
whom he has no genetic ties).
26. See, e.g., In re M.W., 292 P.2d 1158 (Colo. Ct. App. 2012) (construing
C.R.S.A. § 14-10-123(1) allowing the pursuit of an allocation of parental responsibilities for
a child in one who had physical care of the child for six months or more and who pursues
within six months of the termination of such care).
27. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 92-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For example, in
a case involving a former boyfriend (Jim) seeking to establish parentage of a child (Scarlett)
who had been adopted by his former girlfriend during a romantic relationship, In re Scarlett
Z.-D., 2012 IL App (2d) 120266, the court said:
While we are not unsympathetic to Jim's position, or indeed, to Scar-
lett's situation... not only would it be inappropriate for us to ignore ex-
isting Illinois law, but [ I doing so would likely be fraught with unin-
tended consequences. Legal change in this complex area of social signif-
icance must be the product of careful, extensive policy debate, sensitive
not only to the evolving realities of nontraditional families and the needs
of persons within those families, not the least of whom are the children,
but also to parents' fundamental liberty interest embodied in the superior
rights doctrine and its restriction of the ability of the state to interfere in
family matters. In short, the comprehensive legislative solution demand-
ed here must be provided by our General Assembly.
In re Scarlett Z.-D., 2012 IL App (2d) 120266, 49.
At times, common law rulings are made even though legislation is preferred. See, e.g.,
K.E.M. v. P.C.S., 38 A.3d 798 (Pa. 2012) (Melvin, J., concurring) (affirming "the continuing
viability of the [paternity by] the estoppel doctrine in Pennsylvania common law though"
"believ[ing] the General Assembly should consider the creation of relevant legislation").
28. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Mancine, 2012 IL App (1st) 111138, 115 (citing In
re R.L.S., 844 N.E.2d 22 (I11. 2006)). Before Troxel, parental rights to childrear in Illinois,
when challenged by nonparents, seemingly were less superior. See, e.g., Cebrzynski v.
Cebrzynski, 379 N.E.2d 713 (II. App. Ct. 1978) (ordering, as both stepmother and natural
mother were fit parents after father's death, joint and mutual custody to both mothers with
actual physical custody to stepmother alone and with visitation rights to natural mother).
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statutes, as where a custody opportunity may be afforded to a nonparent
"only if [the child] is not in the physical custody of one of his parents."29
There are some "judicially-prescribed" exceptions, as when a man is de-
ceived by the biological mother into believing he is the child's biological
father,30 and some statutory exceptions, as when "reasonable visitation priv-
ileges" are afforded to a stepparent.3 '
The Illinois superior rights doctrine was employed in the 2012 appel-
late court case of In re Marriage of Mancine.32 There, a man was denied
custody (with few words on visitation) because of maternal objection, alt-
hough the man had assumed, with the mother, "a caregiving role over a
significant period of time, 33 and had "established familial or family-like
bonds., 34 There was no talk of "gradations" of nonparents 35 and a rejection
of a de facto parent doctrine3 6 though there was "some embodiment of
family., 37 There was no recognition of a child's liberty interest in preserv-
ing "family-like bonds. 38
In reviewing Troxel and Mancine, this Article will chiefly examine
parentage definitions and nonparent standing in Illinois childcare disputes
involving children born of sex.39 It will explore who may be a parent under
29. In re Marriage of Mancine, 2012 IL App (1st) 111138, 17 (citing 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/601(b)(2) (State Bar Edition 2010)).
30. See, e.g., id. 18 (citing Koelle v. Zwiren, 672 N.E.2d 868 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996)).
31. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/607(b)(1.5) (State Bar Edition 2010) (if "the child is at
least 12 years old" and has lived with the parent and stepparent for at least five years).
32. In re Marriage of Mancine, 2012 IL App (1 st) 111138, 15. A recent compara-
ble case (though the opposite sex couple never married and the child was adopted by the
mother in Slovakia), relying on Mancine, is In re Scarlett Z.-D., 2012 IL App (2d) 120266,
27 ("We agree with the reasoning and the holding of Mancine."). An earlier comparable case
involving a lesbian relationship and a child born of artificial insemination is In re C.B.L.,
723 N.E.2d 316 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
33. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 98-99 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 92-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
36. In re Marriage of Mancine, 2012 IL App (1st) 111138,$$ 15-23.
37. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
38. In re Marriage of Mancine, 2012 IL App (1 st) 111138, 39 ("However, we note
that the Illinois Supreme Court has specifically held that no liberty interest exists with re-
spect to a child's psychological attachment to a nonbiological parent." (citing In re Marriage
of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d 303, 315 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005))).
39. Comparable, but not wholly similar, examinations are also needed regarding
children not born of sex, where further distinctions are likely required, as between children
born and not born to surrogates. In Illinois today, for children bom of assisted reproduction,
there are both general statutory provisions, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT 40/1 to 40/3 (State Bar
Edition 2010), and special provisions governing surrogacy agreements, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT
47/1 to 47/75 (State Bar Edition 2010).
Only for children born of sex has the U.S. Supreme Court recognized automatic parental
status/childrearing rights in most childbearing mothers and paternity opportunity interests in
most copulating fathers (where adulterous men may, in an American state's discretion, not
20131
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Troxel, when might a parent's "superior rights" be lost, and whether possi-
ble parental rights, once lost, might ever be resurrected. The Article will
make recommendations about parenthood status and nonparty standing in
Illinois childcare settings after examining recent precedents and pending
statutory proposals. Generally, the Article will support greater opportunities
for childcare for those with no biological or adoptive ties, but who
childreared for some time, especially with the consent of those with such
ties.
II. TROXEL ON FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CHILDCARE
Brad Troxel committed suicide in May 1993, leaving behind two
daughters whose mother, Tommie Granville, had separated from Brad in
June 1991. Upon separation, Tommie retained residential custody.40 Before
his death, Brad lived in the home of his parents, Gary and Jennifer Troxel,
where he regularly brought the girls for weekend visits. 41 At first, Gary and
Jennifer continued to see their grandchildren on a regular basis after Brad's
death, but in October 1993, Tommie limited their visitation to one short
visit per month.42
Gary and Jennifer then petitioned for additional visits43 under a Wash-
ington statute that arose due "to these changing realities of the American
family. 4 4 In the trial court, the grandparents requested two weekends of
overnight visitation per month and two weeks of visitation each summer.45
Tommie proposed only one day of visitation per month with no overnight
stays.46 The trial court ordered the grandparents have visitation one week-
end per month, one week during the summer, and four hours on each of the
grandparent's birthdays.47
The trial court found authority for such visits in a statute which de-
clared "[a]ny person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time"
and "It]he court may order visitation rights for any person when visitation
have such interests should the mothers and their husbands wish to childcare together). See,
e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130
(1989). This examination encompasses children born of sex to married people and civil
unionized people, as well as to cohabitating couples and other single people.
40. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 60-61.
43. Id. at 61.
44. Id. at 64 ("[P]ersons outside the nuclear family are called upon with increasing
frequency to assist in the everyday tasks of child rearing," especially in single parent house-
holds.).
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may serve the best interest of the child whether or not there has been a
change of circumstances. 48 The trial judge made (what the Troxel plurality
called) "slender findings"49 in concluding that grandparent visitation was in
the children's best interest.
The appellate court reversed on nonconstitutional grounds, holding the
grandparents lacked statutory standing. 50 The Washington high court af-
firmed on different grounds, 51 focusing on the failure of the statute to re-
quire a showing of harm to the child to justify a nonparent visitation order
over parental objection, as well as on the statutory authorization of "[a]ny
person" at "any time" to petition for visitation rights subject only to a best-
interests-of-the-child standard. Each rationale was said to make the statute
facially inconsistent with the Federal Constitution.
52
In a challenge in the U.S. Supreme Court on substantive due process
grounds involving the liberty interests of parents in the care, custody, and
control of their children, 53 the Troxel plurality said parental liberty interests
are "perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests." 54 Supporting
precedents involved the rights of parents "'to direct . . . upbringing"' of
their children,55 to "establish a home and bring up children, 56 and to main-
tain "broad [ ] authority over minor children.,
57
Six U.S. Supreme Court Justices agreed that the Washington statute
was unconstitutional. Justice O'Connor, in her plurality opinion for four
Justices, found the Washington statute unconstitutional as applied.
58 Justic-
es Souter and Thomas found facial invalidity in separate concurring opin-
ions.59
48. Id. at 61, 73 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (2005)).
49. Id. at 72 ("[T]he Superior Court made only two formal findings in support of its
visitation order. First, the Troxels 'are part of a large, central, loving family, all located in
this area, and the [Troxels] can provide opportunities for the children in the areas of cousins
and music. Second, the '[t]he children.. . would be benefitted from spending quality time
with the [Troxels,] provided that that time is balanced with time with the childrens' [sic]
nuclear family."').
50. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 61 (under the Revised Code of Washington section
26.10.160(3), no standing unless a custody action was pending).
51. Id. at62.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 65.
54. Id.
55. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (quoting Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35
(1925)).
56. Id. (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
57. Compare id. (quoting Parham v. JR., 442 U.S. 589, 602 (1979)), with Elwell v.
Byers, 699 F.3d 1208, 1217 (10th Cir. 2012) (noting that pre-adoptive foster parents have
federal constitutional liberty interests in children, though these interests are not as strong as
the liberty interests of biological parents).
58. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 75.
59. Id. at 79 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Washington's third-party visitation statute was problematic because it
effectively permitted any third party to petition a court to review any par-
ent's decision concerning child visitation under a best-interests standard.6 °
The Troxel plurality held the "breathtakingly broad" statute was unconstitu-
tional because it failed to presume that fit parents act in the best interests of
their children or to give any deference to parental decisions. 61 A judicial
determination of a child's best interest cannot warrant court-ordered visita-
tion when the law accords "no special weight" to parental decisions since
the Federal Constitution embodies "a presumption that fit parents act in the
best interests of their children., 62 The Troxel plurality hinted that nonparent
visitation orders would be constitutional when "special weight" is accorded
parental wishes. 63 The Troxel plurality did not condone, however, judicial
interference with parents any time there was "mere disagreement" regard-
64ing a child's best interest. The plurality did not expressly find, as the
Washington high court did, that a showing of harm or potential harm was
necessary in order to sustain nonparent visitation.65
60. Id. at 67 (plurality opinion).
61. Id. The need for both a presumption and some deference has been read as re-
quired by Troxel in grandparent visitation cases. See, e.g., Ex Parte E.R.G., 73 So. 3d 634
(Ala. 2011).
62. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67-68. The constitutional presumption that parents act in the
best interest of their children was important to the Troxel plurality because the Troxels did
not allege, and no court found, that Tommie was an unfit parent. Id. at 68.
63. Id. at 67-68. In New Hampshire, "special weight" means a nonparent must
show, to obtain court-ordered childcare, "by clear and convincing evidence that" such an
order is the child's best interests, meaning it promotes "the child's essential physical and
safety needs," with adverse consequences to the child's psychological well-being if there is
no order. In re Guardianship of Reena D., 163 N.H. 107, 114 (2011).
64. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67-68. See also id. at 72 (noting that dispute "involves noth-
ing more than a simple disagreement between the Washington Superior Court and Granville
concerning her children's best interest"). Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)
("The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management
of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or lost
temporary custody of their child to the State.").
65. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73, 77. Today, harm or potential harm is often required. See,
e.g., Hernandez v. Hernandez, 265 P.3d 495 (Idaho 2011) (holding that grandparents could
seek custody though no threshold showing of parental unfitness); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§
25-5-29(4), -30(2), -30(4), -30(5), -30(8) (2004) (stating that serious detriment to the child
can prompt nonparent custody or visitation, where assessment factors include "unjustifiable
absence of parental custody"; "bonded relationship between child" and nonparent; "substan-
tial enhancement of the child's well-being while under" nonparent's care; and "degree of
stability and security in the child's future with the parent"), construed in Feist v. Lemieux-
Feist, 793 N.W.2d 57 (S.D. 2010) (holding that third-party custody or visitation need not be
preceded by explicit finding of parental unfitness), Beach v. Coisman, 814 N.W.2d 135
(S.D. 2012) (similar to Feist); Bowen v. Bowen, 2012 Ark. App. 403 (2012) (holding that
grandparents seeking visitation must show likelihood of harm to child if visits are denied).
When harm or potential harm is required, there is sometimes disagreement on whether the
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In concurring in the judgment, Justice Souter focused only on what the
plurality characterized as a "breathtakingly broad" statute,66 which Souter
described as authorizing "'any person' at "any time' to petition for and to
receive visitation rights subject only to a free-ranging best-interests-of-the-
child standard. 67 He chose to "say no more, ' 68 thus not commenting upon
the constitutionality of more narrowly drawn statutes or upon any necessary
"special weight" or "presumption., 69
In concurring in the judgment, Justice Thomas simply noted one basis:
"[T]he State of Washington lacks even a legitimate governmental interest-
to say nothing of a compelling one-in second-guessing any fit parent's
decision regarding visitation with third parties.
70
The three dissenters each filed a separate opinion. Justice Stevens
deemed that it "would have been [ ] wiser to deny certiorari."'', As to the
statute, he found its terms were "unconstrued" by the state high court so
that a remand was in order.72 He noted there was no "basis for holding that
the statute is invalid in all its applications, ' '73 observing that the statute
should survive a facial challenge if it had "a 'plainly legitimate sweep."'
74
In dissent, Justice Scalia, while recognizing an "unenumerated right"
"of parents to direct the upbringing of their children, 75 previously protect-
burden of proof is preponderance, Hollis v. Miller, No. 306090, 2012 WL 5853824 (Mich.
Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2012), or clear and convincing evidence, id. (Gleicher, J., concurring). At
times, future substantial harm resulting from no grandparent visits is statutorily presumed.
See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-306(b)(4) (2010) (stating that "rebuttable presumption of
substantial harm to the child based upon the cessation of the relationship between the child
and grandparent" when the child's parent is deceased and the grandparent seeking visitation
is the parent of the deceased parent).
66. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67.
67. Id. at 76 (Souter, J., concurring) (employing the Washington Supreme Court
view).
68. Id. at 75.
69. Id. at 77 ("[T]here is no need to decide whether harm is required or to consider
the precise scope of the parent's right or its necessary protections.").
70. Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring).
71. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 80 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 84-85. The Washington statute was similar to a Connecticut statute, which
has been construed in line with Troxel. See, e.g., DiGiovanna v. St. George, 12 A.3d 900,
907-08 (Conn. 2011) (recognizing that in Roth v. Weston, 789 A.2d 431 (Conn. 2002), the
court "substituted the parent-like relationship and substantial harm elements for the statutory
elements of 'any person' and 'best interest of the child,' respectively, as ajudicial gloss to []
remedy the constitutionally infirm language").
73. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 85 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 85 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 739-40 & n.7 (1997)
(Stevens, J., concurring)).
75. Id. at 91-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the right is among both the "unalien-
able [r]ights" recognized in the Declaration of Independence and "the othe[r] [rights] re-
tained by the people" per the Ninth Amendment).
2013]
NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITYLA WREVIEW
ed by substantive due process, 6 nevertheless opined that any additional
limits on this right are best determined "in legislative chambers or in elec-
toral campaigns" and not in courts.7 7 He warned that extending further op-
portunities for "[j]udicial vindication" of parental rights78 would require the
Court to formulate "a judicially crafted definition of parents"; 79 "judicially
approved assessments of 'harm to the child'; 80 and "judicially defined gra-
dations of other persons (grandparents, extended family members, adoptive
family members in an adoption later found to be invalid, long term guardi-
ans, etc.)" who have childcare claims against parental wishes. 81 He had no
desire for "a new regime of judicially prescribed, and federally prescribed,
family law."
82
Justice Kennedy, in dissent, thought the case should be remanded so
that the state courts could consider whether, and to what extent, child visits
with nonparents (or just grandparents) might be ordered over parental ob-
jections because the visits served the children's best interests, as well as
whether child harm "is required in every instance.' 83 Justice Kennedy
opined that a "harm to the child standard" is not always required by the
Federal Constitution when nonparent visits are ordered, 84 given that "the
conventional nuclear family . . . is simply not the structure or prevailing
condition in many households., 85 He recognized there may be "a substantial
number of cases in which a third party, by acting in a caregiving role over a
significant period of time, has developed a relationship with a child which
is not necessarily subject to absolute parental veto, 86 suggesting such a
third party might be deemed a "de facto" parent.
87
Since Troxel, the U.S. Supreme Court has not spoken. State statutes
and common law rulings vary. Illinois law and the different laws in other
states will now be explored via the 2012 Illinois appellate court decision in
Mancine.
76. Id. at 92 (noting that two of the three precedents originated in "an era rich in
substantive due process holdings that have since been repudiated").
77. Id. at 92 (noting that while it is "entirely compatible with the commitment to
representative democracy to argue, in legislative chambers or in electoral campaigns" about
parental childrearing authority, it is wrong for judges, via "unenumerated" constitutional
right analysis, "to deny legal effect to laws that ... infringe").
78. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 92.
79. Id. at 92.
80. Id. at 93.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 92-93.
83. Troxel, 530 U.S.at 94 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 101-02.
85. Id. at 98.
86. Id. at 98, 100-01 ("In short, a fit parent's right vis-A-vis a complete stranger is
one thing: her right vis-a-vis another parent or a defacto parent may be another.").
87. Id. at 100-01.
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III. MANCINE ON SUPERIOR PARENTAL RIGHTS IN ILLINOIS
In Mancine, the appeals court affirmed that in civil cases, legal
parenthood of children born of sex is contextual, meaning that parentage
definitions depend upon setting; 88 that there is not, as of yet, much common
law on legal parenthood; that legal parentage may not track actual parent-
ing; that sometimes a child's best interests need not be considered in deter-
mining legal parenthood; and that there are exceptions to superior parental
interests "in the care, custody, and control of their children. 89
Mancine involved a marriage dissolution proceeding in which both the
husband, Nicholas Gansner, and his wife, Miki Loveland Mancine, sought
custody of a minor, William, born in August 2008.90 William had been
adopted by Miki in Wisconsin in March 2009 before her marriage to Nicho-
las in May 2009, though a preadoption wedding had been contemplated. 91
By the time she met Nicholas, Miki already had another adopted child,
88. For children born of assisted reproduction, legal parentage can also be contextu-
al. See, e.g., Kristine S. Knaplund, Children of Assisted Reproduction, 45 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 899 (2012) (describing differences between Uniform Probate and Uniform Parent-
age Acts).
89. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (plurality opinion).
90. While the facts important to the court's opinion were generally undisputed,
many other facts were contested but never subject to evidentiary hearing(s) in the trial court.
Some of these disputed facts, gleaned from the appellate court briefs, will be reviewed here-
in as they are relevant to the preferred alternative approaches.
91. In re Marriage of Mancine, 2012 IL App (1 st) 111138, 3-4 ("Miki and Nich-
olas decided they would marry in approximately June or July of 2008... William [the child
involved in the custody dispute] was born on August 5, 2008 ... Nicholas and Miki became
formally engaged in December 2008."). The appellate court's factual account is derived
chiefly from trial court pleadings and affidavits on which there was no trial but little party
disagreement. The appellate court briefs reveal, however, other facts disputed by the parties,
which evidently were unimportant to the court's resolution. For example, Miki and Nicholas
disagreed on why Nicholas got a vasectomy. Compare Brief of Respondent-Appellant at 2,
In Re Marriage of Mancine, 2012 IL App (1 st) 111138 (No. 10 D 9394) [hereinafter Appel-
lant Brief] (believing Miki "that he would be William's father forever," Nicholas got a vas-
ectomy), with Response Brief of Petitioner-Appellee at 13-14, In Re Marriage of Mancine,
2012 IL App (1 st) 111138 (No. 10 D 9394) [hereinafter Appellee Brief] (urging the vasec-
tomy was prompted because Nicholas "did not want to pass on his genetic material for his
mental illness (depression, et. cetera)," while noting the vasectomy was not mentioned in
Nicholas's trial court pleadings or his affidavit). The parties also disagreed on whether "Miki
engaged in pathological extramarital sexual behavior" and prostitution during her marriage
to Nicholas. Compare Appellant Brief at 22, with Appellee Brief at 11-12 ("smear cam-
paign" which is "repugnant"). The briefs also reveal additional factual assertions which
seem undisputed, but outside the appellate court opinion. See, e.g., Appellant Brief at 5
(stating Nicholas and Miki had their first date in the spring of 2008, a few days before Miki
and John Mancine officially divorced; even then, Nicholas knew of soon-to-be William's
adoption, and of Elizabeth), id. at 6-7 (stating Nicholas and Miki accompanied William's
birth mother to the hospital "and were with her in the delivery room").
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Elizabeth, who earlier lived with Miki and her ex-husband John Mancine.92
In Wisconsin, an unmarried couple cannot simultaneously adopt a child, but
a single woman can adopt.93 Within a month of William's birth, Nicholas
and Miki "had moved in" together and "Nicholas . . .was co-parenting Wil-
liam."
94
An adoption agent advised Nicholas that he could adopt William as a
stepparent after the marriage. 95 William's birth certificate did reflect Nicho-
las's last name, though Nicholas only married Miki in Wisconsin about two
months after William's adoption was finalized. 96 Nicholas had moved in
with Miki at least nine months before the wedding and was co-parenting at
their home.97 Nicholas was named by Miki in prospective adoption papers
(though evidently not in a court proceeding) "as the [child's] sole guardian"
about three months before the wedding. 98 Finally, Nicholas and Miki were
named as "parents" on William's baptism record about seven months before
the wedding. 99
About a month after the wedding, the adoption agency said it would
support a stepparent adoption. 00 About a year later, the agency told Nicho-
las he was free to file his petition for stepparent adoption °' at a time when
yet a third child, Henry, was soon to be adopted. 0 2 At that time, Nicholas
primarily cared for all the children in the household since only Miki was
working.10 3 When Nicholas began working, he continued his childcare.1
0 4
92. In re Marriage of Mancine, 2012 IL App (1st) 111138, 3 (stating when Miki
and Nicholas began dating in the spring of 2008, Elizabeth-Miki's adopted daughter-was
one-year-old and Miki was separated from her then-husband, John Mancine; Miki and Nich-
olas had at one time planned to marry in June or July of 2008).
93. Id. 1 3 (citing WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.82 (West 2008)).
94. Id. 4.
95. Id. 3.
96. Id. TT 4-5 (noting William, the adopted child, was born in August 2008; his
adoption by Miki was finalized in Wisconsin on March 4, 2009; Miki and Nicholas were
married in May 2009).
97. Id. 1 4 (explaining William was born in August 2008 and was living with Miki
and Nicholas in a single home by early September 2008; Miki and Nicholas married in May
2009.).
98. In re Marriage of Mancine, 2012 IL App (1st) 111138, TT 4-5 ("Miki named
Nicholas as the sole guardian of William and any future child she has, and named her par-
ents as alternate guardians.").
99. Id. 4 (baptism occurred in November 2008 and the wedding occurred in May
2009).
100. Id. 5.
101. Id. (an August 2010 email to Nicholas).
102. Id. 16.
103. In re Marriage of Mancine, 2012 IL App (1st) 111138, 1 7 (stating that by then,




SUPERIOR PARENTAL RIGHTS IN ILLINOIS
According to Nicholas, Miki held the couple and all the children out as a
family unit, using the last name of Gansner.
10 5
Miki sought a divorce about fifteen months into the marriage, after the
entire family moved to Illinois to be closer to Miki's parents.10 6 Miki chal-
lenged Nicholas's standing to seek custody of William as William had nev-
er been adopted by Nicholas.1°7 Because the family had lived in Illinois for
more than six months, both the trial108 and appellate0 9 courts employed
Illinois law 10 and found a lack of standing in Nicholas."' The courts reject-
ed "equitable parent," "equitable estoppel" (barring Miki from challenging
Nicholas's standing), "equitable adoption," and parens patriae arguments.112
105. Id. ("According to Nicholas, Miki always held out William as Nicholas' child
and held out herself, Nicholas, Elizabeth, William and Henry as 'the Gansner family.').
Two months after seeking to divorce Nicholas, Miki petitioned to change William's last
name to Mancine, her first husband's last name. In re Marriage of Mancine, 2012 IL App
(1st) 111138 (No. 10 D 9594) at I n.I [hereinafter Appellant Petition].
106. In re Marriage of Mancine 2012 IL App (1 st) 111138, 9 (dissolution sought on
September 24, 2010).
107. Id. 11.
108. Id. (explaining that the trial court dismissed because "Nicholas lacked stand-
ing").
109. Id. 12 ("Nicholas' arguments are not well grounded.").
110. The Illinois courts employed Illinois, and not Wisconsin laws, seemingly be-
cause William's "home state" was Illinois. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 36/102(7) (2010)
("state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six
consecutive months immediately before the commencement of the child custody proceed-
ing"). Had Wisconsin law been applied, the outcome may have differed. See, e.g., Randy
A.J. v. Norma I.J., 677 N.W.2d 630, 641-42 (Wis. 2004) (precluding the use of "the equita-
ble parent doctrine," court allows "equitable estoppel" to "address those instances where
unfairness in a proceeding would harm children and adults, absent the intervention of the
court's equitable powers"); Hendrick v. Hendrick, 765 N.W.2d 865, 868 (Wis. 2009) ("[T]he
focus of a proceeding to determine a child's paternity is whether the 'best interests' of the
child would be served thereby."). But see In re Christian R.H., 794 N.W.2d 230, 233-34 n.7
(Wis. Ct. App. 2010) (stating that while there is common law authority to order child "visita-
tion," there is no nonstatutory authority to confer "parental rights"). Had William been for-
mally adopted by Nicholas under Wisconsin laws, the Mancine court would likely have
deferred to Wisconsin adoption law. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 45/27 (2010) (stating
that full faith and credit to paternity establishments in other states when done "through vol-
untary acknowledgment, tests to determine inherited characteristics, or judicial or adminis-
trative processes"). See also Port v. Cowan, 426 Md. 435 (2012) (stating that under the doc-
trine of comity, Maryland allows same-sex couples to wed in a civil ceremony in California
to divorce in Maryland though a same-sex marriage was not then allowed in Maryland,
where same-sex marriage was also not explicitly deemed by the Maryland legislature as void
or unenforceable). On when "home state" law may not be applied (e.g., so that a Mancine
court would apply Wisconsin common law rulings), see, e.g., Castro v. Castro, 818 N.W.2d
753 (N.D. 2012).
111. In re Marriage of Mancine, 2012 IL App (I st) 1111
38, 12.
112. Neither the trial nor appellate court examined whether the trial judge had some
other, independent authority to order "a child's best interest" inquiry during the custody
dispute between Miki and Nicholas. See, e.g., In re Joshua S., 2012 IL App (2d) 120197
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The appellate court noted, in rejecting equitable parenthood, that by
statute, Nicholas, as a nonparent, could only seek custody if William was
not in the "physical custody" of Miki.1 13 It did observe, however, that Nich-
olas would have had standing to seek custody if Miki deceived him into
believing he was William's biological father if William was born of sex to
Miki, though here there may be no statute. 114 It did not address in detail
why an adoptive parent's deception involving a nonparent who could not be
a natural parent should not prompt a hearing for the nonparent wishing to
(invalidating a criminal case plea agreement where the State promised not to seek parental
rights termination; the court ruled: "A trial court, if convinced that it is in a child's best
interest, can order the State to prosecute a petition for termination of parental rights against
the State's wishes without violating the separation-of-powers doctrine.").
113. In re Marriage of Mancine, 2012 IL App (1st) 111138, 17 (citing 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/601(b)(2) (2010)); see also In re T.W., 851 N.E.2d 881 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
Illinois is not alone in its focus on "physical custody." See, e.g., In re B.B.O., 277 P.3d 318
(Colo. 2012) (stating that parental consent to nonparent child care is unnecessary where
child is not in parent's physical custody and nonparent has cared for child for at least six
months).
114. Id. 18 (citing Koelle v. Zwiren, 672 N.E.2d 868 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996)). In
Koelle v. Zwiren, a deception case, the court expressly recognized there was no statutory
standing to seek visitation for the deceived man who actually parented if the natural mother
objected, but that "general principles of equity" supported standing. Koelle, 672 N.E.2d at
872 (no support in Illinois Parentage Act or Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage
Act). Koelle relied, in part, on In re Townsend, 427 N.E.2d 1231 (Ill. 1981), where a natural
mother was in prison and the child was being raised by this mother's daughter, who sought
custody as did the natural father. Townsend, 427 N.E.2d at 1233, 1237. There too both the
majority, id. at 1235 (stating that no divorce, adoption or juvenile court statute applied, but
the Probate Act-though technically inapplicable-supports the superior parental rights
doctrine in cases like this), and dissent, id at 1239 ("a deficiency in the statutes") (Simon, J.,
dissenting), found that while no statute was applicable, the daughter might obtain custody if
she overcame the father's superior right to childrear via a showing of the child's best inter-
ests. Koelle also employed another deceived father case, In re Marriage of Roberts, 649
N.E.2d 1344 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995), where a deceived husband had standing to seek visitation
notwithstanding the natural mother's superior rights, as well as a foster parent case, In re
Ashley, 571 N.E.2d 905 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), where the foster parents had custody and were
de facto parents for the child's first five years before the natural parents (former drug ad-
dicts) sought custody and where the court seemingly would allow the foster parents custody
based "solely on the best interest" of the child, In re Ashley, 571 N.E.2d at 930-31. Koelle,
284 672 N.E.2d at 872-74. Since Troxel, any custody or visitation requests by nonparents,
like aunts or foster caregivers, would be subject to much closer scrutiny given recognized
parental liberty interests in their children. See, e.g., In re R.L.S., 844 N.E.2d 22, 34 (Il1.
2006) (stating that under Troxel, Probate Act does not allow "divesting a parent of custody"
in the absence of "a finding of unfitness as a condition precedent"); In re Scarlett D.-Z.,
2012 IL App (2d) 120266, 34 ("We have serious doubts that Koelle, decided before Troxel,
would survive scrutiny under a Troxel analysis.").
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childcare as long as the child's best interests might be served. Evidently,
male beliefs in (possible) biological ties are important.'
l 5
The appeals court in Mancine hinted (though not strongly) that Nicho-
las may have had standing to seek visitation (as compared to custody). 16
However, an uncited Illinois statute says "reasonable visitation privileges"
may be granted to a stepparent only if "the child is at least 12 years old"
and the child has lived with the parent and stepparent for at least five
years.' 17 The court did not address any common law stepparent visitation
rights going beyond this statute or other statutes that might confer childcare
standing on Nicholas.' 18
As to equitable estoppel, 1 9 the appeals court found no misrepresenta-
tion or concealment of a material fact, as Nicholas always knew "that for-
115. The appellate court also did not address how maternal deception about biologi-
cal ties would undercut the superior parental right under Troxel. In re Marriage of Mancine,
2012 IL App (1st) 111138, 14-17.
116. In re Marriage of Mancine, 2012 IL App (1 st) 111138, 18 (recognizing there
are "exceptions ... where a nonparty may be awarded custody or visitation"; Koelle, cited
by Nicholas, was distinguished as there the deceived father "sought only visitation privileg-
es"). See also In re Marriage of Mancine, 2012 IL App (1st) 111138, 20 (distinguishing
another case cited by Nicholas, In re Marriage of Roberts, 649 N.E.2d 1344 (I11. App. Ct.
1995), because in that case there was a presumption of paternity in the man seeking child
custody due to marriage at the time of birth).
117. Comapre 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/607(b)(1.5) (2010), with CAL. FAMILY CODE
3101 (a), (c), (d)(2) (West 2004) (stating that in a marriage dissolution proceeding a steppar-
ent may obtain "reasonable visitation" if "in the best interest of the minor child" and not in
conflict with the custody or visitation rights of a birth parent not a party to the dissolution
proceeding).
118. There are statutory provisions on "reasonable visitation rights" for
"[g]randparents, great-grandparents, and siblings of a minor child, who is one year or older,"
where "there is an unreasonable denial of visitation by a parent" and perhaps parental objec-
tion. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/607(a), (a-3), (a-5)(1)(A-15) (2010). See also In re R.L.S., 844
N.E.2d at 34 (stating that grandparents who petition for guardianship of grandchild need not
show lack of physical custody in parent; but to prevail, they must show each parent is unfit).
There are also statutory provisions allowing guardians to seek visitation where natural par-
ents desire to end the guardianships and nonparent visits. See, e.g., In re T.P.S., 2011 IL App
(5th) 100617 (citing 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-14.1(b) (2010)) (stating that a former same-
sex female partner had standing; even with material change of circumstances, as with a
breakup of a same-sex couple, earlier-appointed guardian-who had secured a natural par-
ent's consent--could continue visitation if it served the best interests of the minor).
119. In re Marriage of Mancine, 2012 IL App (1 st) 111138, 25-29. Parenthood by
equitable estoppel differs from equitable parenthood because only with the former may one,
here Nicholas, choose to block the attempt by another, here Miki, to deny one's (here Nicho-
las's) parenthood. Seemingly, with equitable parentage, one may not choose to avoid
parenthood one had earlier embraced. See, e.g., In re Mallett, 37 A.3d 333, 336 (N.H. 2012)
(distinguishing the two equitable concepts in discussing the limited opportunity for a com-
mon law marriage). Equitable estoppel may also bar one who petitions for a parentage order
from seeking such an order. See, e.g, In re Felix 0., 89 A.D. 1089 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011)
(stating that the alleged natural father is barred from attacking marital paternity presumption
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mal adoption was necessary." 120 It suggested Nicholas slept on his rights. 121
Nicholas's vasectomy, prompted by Miki's treatment of him as a father, did
not help him in his quest for custody, as reliance on statements become
irrelevant when the statements are not false or misleading. 
122
As to equitable adoption, the court found the theory was unavailable in
Illinois custody cases.123 Yet, the court observed that the theory is available
in intestate succession and wrongful death cases, particularly if there had
been a "contract to adopt., 124 In these cases, however, a child would benefit
financially regardless of the level of earlier childrearing and there would be
no childcare issues.
As to parens patriae, there was no statutory provision generally allow-
ing a nonparent to seek custody even if in the child's best interests. 25 Any
such a provision would create tensions with "[t]he superior rights doctrine,"
for mother's husband, as paternity case filed five years after birth); In re Starla D., 95 A.D.
1605 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (alleging biological father may equitably estop mother's pursuit
of paternity order when she acquiesced in development of a close relationship between child
and another father figure where the disruption of that relationship would be detrimental to
child's interests; no estoppel here as no "recognized and operative parent-child relationship"
in another man); see also TEXAS ESTATES CODE ANN. § 1002.004 (West 2011) (for guardian-
ship proceedings, "'[c]hild' includes" one "adopted by a parent under a statutory procedure
or by acts of estoppel"). Similar is TEXAS PROBATE CODE ANN. § 601(3) (West, Westlaw
through the end of the 2011 Regular Session and First Called Session of the 82nd Legisla-
ture).
120. InreMarriageofMancine, 2012 ILApp(lst) 111138,727.
121. Id. 29 (stating that upon noting that Nicholas never petitioned to adopt Wil-
liam, the court quoted Bell v. Louisville & Nashville, R.R. Co., 106 Il1 .2d 135, 146 (1985)
[which cited Flannery v. Flannery, 51 N.E.2d 349, 354 (1943), where the court said:
"[e]quity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights."]).
122. In re Marriage of Mancine, 2012 IL App (1st) 111138, 25. Had Miki treated
Nicholas as a father in some agreed court order, then Nicholas may have acquired parental
standing. In re Marriage of Schlam, 648 N.E.2d 345 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (stating that moth-
er's earlier agreement, during divorce, to joint parenting estopped her from challenging
former husband's visitation interests years later, though ex-husband was not a presumed
father as he married the mother six years after the birth of the child); In re M.M.D., 820
N.E.2d 392, 401 (Ill. 2004) (stating that father's earlier agreement on grandparent visitation
incorporated into a court order was enforceable even when based on a statute later declared
unconstitutional; father could seek court modification of visitation order). The Mancine
court incidentally observed that even if reliance on Miki's misrepresentations or conceal-
ments were relevant, any "such reliance was not reasonable." In re Marriage of Mancine,
2012 IL App (1st) 111138, T 29.
123. In re Marriage of Mancine, 2012 IL App (lst) 111138, 77 31-34.
124. Id. IT 32-34 (showing the court was more sympathetic to equitable adoption in
intestate succession cases, as here the children benefit and there is no infringement on supe-
rior parental rights); see also infra notes 127-129 and accompanying text. See also DeHart v.
DeHart, 2012 IL App (3d) 090773 (stating that in intestate succession setting there can be
both a contract to adopt and an equitable adoption claim by one who was neither born to nor
formally adopted by the decedent).
125. In re Marriage of Mancine, 2012 IL App (1st) 111138, T 37.
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encompassing rights involving the "care, custody and control of [ ] chil-
dren. 126
Finally, as to leaving the child "fatherless," the court observed that "no
liberty interest exists with respect to a child's psychological attachment to a
nonbiological parent."' 27 Evidently as well, there was no common law in-
terest held by William or Nicholas. 128 Recognition of parent-like attach-
ments, to serve children's as well as societal and nonparents' interests,
seemingly must come in Illinois via statute. In the trial court in Mancine,
the circuit judge lamented over the lack of general statutory authority, say-
ing "our evolving social structure has created nontraditional relationships"
that demand "a comprehensive legislative solution.,
129
New Illinois statutes should respond to Mancine by expressly permit-
ting expanded opportunities for parenthood13 or by establishing broader
126. Id. 37 (saying that no precedent cited allows "extraordinary" judicial power to
confer standing on one in a custody case who "is not legally" the parent of the child).
127. Id. 39 (citing In re Marriage of Sterling Simmons, 355 Il. App. 3d 945, 956,
which cited In re Petition of Otakar Kirchner, 164 Ill. 2d 468, 500 (2006); in these two cas-
es, the lack of a "liberty interest" was found regarding "a child's psychological attachment to
a nonbiological parent," including a transsexual male who undertook an "invalid same-sex
marriage" to a woman who later bore "an artificially inseminated child," In re Marriage of
Sterling Simmons, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 945, 955-56 (2005), and an adoptive parent who
childreared under a private adoption that was later deemed invalid, Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d at
472-474). But see Lofton v. Sec'y of DCFS, 358 F.3d 804, 814 (11 th Cir. 2004) (stating that
a liberty interest could arise where state law "created a 'justifiable expectation' of family
unit permanency," as with a foster parent, or a legal guardian, or perhaps a common law
parent).
128. Simmons v. Simmons, 486 N.W.2d 788 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (former steppar-
ent, with no statutory right to visitation because he had not lived with the child for two years,
could urge a common law right to visitation if in loco parentis to the child).
129. Transcript of Proceedings at 14, Mancine v. Gansner, No. 10D9394 (2011).
Judge Katz also observed that it was an "unfortunate situation" that Nicholas lacked standing
to seek custody under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act and that she
"would love nothing better than to determine what is in William's best interests" regarding
Nicholas's parenting in this "heart breaking case." Id. at 5, 14-15.
130. See, e.g., Stephen N. Peskind, Who's Your Daddy? An Analysis of Illinois' Law
of Parentage and the Meaning of Parenthood, 35 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 811 (2004) (stating that
parentage opportunities for nonbiological and nonadoptive parents in Illinois should be
grounded in new statutory provisions generally prioritizing children's best interests).
Peskind's argument not fully embraced herein, in part, because of its difficulties under Lehr
v. Robertson, as described in Jeffrey A. Parness & Zachary Townsend, Legal Paternity (and
Other Parenthood) After Lehr and Michael H., 43 U. TOL. L. REv. 225 (2012) (stating that
federal constitutional paternity opportunity interests in unwed fathers who sire children via
sex with unwed mothers), and because of the need under the Illinois superior rights doctrine
that consents (express or implicit) by natural or adoptive parents for others to childrear usu-
ally be judicially recognized. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Engelkens, 821 N.E.2d 799 (Il.
App. Ct. 2004) (stating that the child's best interests cannot override a biological father's
decision to discontinue reasonable visitation privileges for former stepmother notwithstand-
ing his earlier agreement to allow such visits where the former stepmother did not detrimen-
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judicial discretion to recognize childcare opportunities for nonparents. 3 '
For now, per Mancine, childcare decisions generally are left to "natural or
adoptive parents.'
' 32
IV. ILLINOIS CHILDCARE AFTER MANCINE
Mancine affirms the importance of context, as with equitable adoption
in intestate and wrongful death cases. Differing approaches to legal
parenthood for Nicholas also seem appropriate during his marriage to Miki,
as in either a child support'33 or a parental neglect 134 setting.
tally alter her position in reliance on the agreement); In re Coulter, 2012 IL 113474 (stating
that joint parenting agreements on relocation differ when they are and are not incorporated
into court orders).
131. For an argument that Illinois common law should recognize childcare interests
in nonbiological and nonadoptive child caretakers whose same sex couple relationships are
dissolving, see Desir6 Sierens, Protecting the Parent-Child Relationship: The Need for Illi-
nois Courts to Extend Standing to Non-biological Parents in Regard to Visitation Proceed-
ings, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 483 (2005).
132. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/2 (West 1984). While certainty seemingly is
promoted, it comes at the expense of children's and adults' lived experiences and legitimate
expectations, creating a new class of illegitimate children. Carlos A. Ball, Rendering Chil-
dren Illegitimate in Former Partner Parenting Cases: Hiding Behind the Facade of Certain-
ty, 20 AM. UNIV. J. OF GENDER, SOC. POL'Y & L. 623 (2012).
133. See, e.g., Wener v. Wener, 312 N.Y.S.2d 815, 819 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970) (stat-
ing that the husband must support child he neither fathered nor adopted, since husband had
agreed at one time to adopt and had treated the child as his own prior to a marital separa-
tion). Compare OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 108.045(1) ("[T]he education of minor children,
including stepchildren, are chargeable upon the property of both husband and wife, or either
of them."), and S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-7-8 ("A stepparent shall maintain his spouse's
children born prior to their marriage and is responsible as a parent for their support and
education suitable to his circumstances."), with VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 296 ("A stepparent
has a duty to support a stepchild if they reside in the same household and if the financial
resources of the natural or adoptive parents are insufficient to provide the child with a rea-
sonable subsistence consistent with decency and health."), DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 501(b)
("[W]here the parents are unable to provide a minor child's minimum needs, a stepparent or
person who cohabits in the relationship of husband and wife with the parent of a minor child
shall be under a duty to provide those needs."), HAW. REV. STAT. § 577-4 ("A stepparent
who acts in loco parentis is bound to provide, maintain, and support the stepparent's step-
child during the residence of the child with the stepparent if the legal parents desert the child
or are unable to support the child, thereby reducing the child to destitute and necessitous
circumstances."), and Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.400(1) ("A stepparent shall support his or her
stepchild to the same extent that a natural or adoptive parent is required to support his or her
child so long as the stepchild is living in the same house as the stepparent."). See also OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 112.4 ("A stepparent is not required to maintain his or her spouse's
children from a prior relationship.").
134. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 555/1(a)(6), (b) (stating that a step-parent
commits an offense as a parent if he or she knowingly permits a minor to break curfew).
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Mancine also prompts thoughts about childcare reforms, especially if
one sympathizes with Nicholas and laments his likely absence in William's
(and Elizabeth's) life. What should have happened to the children in
Mancine if Miki died a day after the marriage dissolution order granted her
sole custody of William, as Nicholas could not then pursue child custody
under the current Illinois statute recognizing stepparent interests?135 Should
Nicholas be accorded at least some parental opportunity interests if Miki,
during the marriage, sought to place William (and Elizabeth) for adoption?
While context matters, given current Illinois statutes and the disincli-
nation of Illinois courts for further common law developments, unfortunate-
ly a child's best interests (as well as societal and nonparent interests in chil-
dren) often will not be well-served. The "superior rights" of parents will be
favored in childcare settings regardless of what parents do, short of aban-
donment or significant abuse. In certain noncare settings, such as intestacy
and wrongful death, however, common law "contract to adopt" principles
will be key, as here there are only financial benefits to children, no parental
childrearing interests, no concerns about children's best interests regarding
childcare, and no possible infringements on superior parental rights.
136
It is time to redo childcare statutes, or at least to recognize broader
common law powers that could serve children's best interests without inter-
fering unduly with superior parental rights. 37 Illinois lawmakers should
135. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/601(b)(3) (Nicholas was no longer a stepparent).
Nicholas could pursue custody as a nonparent, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 601(b)(2) (since
William was not in the physical custody of a parent). But, Nicholas is given no superior
rights to other nonparents, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 601(b)(2), including grandparents
who have special statutory standing regarding custody when there are no parents available to
childrear. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 601(b)(4) (likely to apply to Miki's parents even
though the statute does mention a "surviving parent" since Nicholas was not a surviving
parent to William). Nicholas suggested that if he died a day after the dissolution, William
"could seek to inherit." Appellant Petition at 19, Mancine v. Gansner, No. 10D9394 (2011).
136. In re Marriage of Mancine, 2012 IL App (1 st) 11138, 32 (stating that where
decedents had orally contracted to adopt, intestate decedents' estates must be shared with
those who were intended to be adopted). By contrast, where intended parents sue for wrong-
ful death of children not formally adopted, but for whom there were contracts to adopt, such
intended parents are not the next of kin under the wrongful death statute. Id. 33.
137. See, e.g., T.M.H. v. D.M.T., 79 So. 3d 787 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011), a case
involving possible future childrearing by a woman who provided her ova to her lesbian
partner so both women could childrear; a concurring opinion declared:
I write [ ] to highlight the unfortunate absence of an important considera-
tion that should inform our decision in cases such as this. Yes, I know,
as did the able trial judge, that the best interests of the child is ordinarily
not the test to be applied ... I think we need to find a way to redirect our
focus in cases of this kind so that best interests becomes part of the deci-
sional matrix. Surely we have to make room for that factor in the cruci-
ble. Exploring the parental rights of one litigant or the other should not
be the end of our deliberations. In the final analysis, we still ought to
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redefine parents who possess superior childrearing rights; create additional
exceptions allowing nonparents to childcare where there are "special fac-
tors"; and recognize the prospect of resurrected childcare interests for those
earlier foreclosed, as when parents die. Floodgates will not open if legisla-
tors proceed cautiously.'
1 38
The Illinois General Assembly recently recognized the need for re-
forms by creating a study committee, resulting in the January 2013 pro-
posed Illinois Parentage Act (Proposed Parentage Act). 39 The study com-
mittee also proposed amendments in 2012 to the Illinois Marriage and Dis-
solution Act (Proposed MDM Act)140 on childcare. The proposals must be
read together. For example, the marital presumptions establishing parentage
are found in the Proposed Parentage Act, 14 1 while the Proposed MDM Act
establishes parentage for certain unwed parents. 142 The proposals, at times,
come to grips with what is best for the child. Here, having two parents is
better than one.
T.MH, 79 So. 3d at 804-05 (Monaco, J., concurring).
138. Miki argued that any recognition of Nicholas' child care interests in William
"would open the floodgates" to any ex-boyfriend or to "virtually anyone" who cared for
William. Appellee's Answer to Petition for Leave to Appeal at 4, Mancine v. Gansner, No.
10D9394 (2011) [hereinafter Appellee Answer]. Similar concerns have been judicially ex-
pressed where adequate limits have nevertheless been found. See, e.g., Chatterjee v. King,
280 P.3d 283, 297 (N.M. 2012) (Bosson, J., specially concurring) ("I agree with the outcome
reached by the majority, but on narrower grounds. I write out of concern that this Opinion
might be interpreted to expand the population of presumed parents in a manner that would
shake settled expectations of custody rights and child support responsibilities.").
Open adoption contracts could also subject to floodgate concerns. But, as Professor Brian
Bix observes: "Gradually, courts and legislatures have moved toward making these ar-
rangements enforceable. As of May 2011, 26 states and the District of Columbia have stat-
utes authorizing the enforcement of such agreements." "Agreements in Family Law," posted
at SSRN, abstract 2125343, at 15 (March 1, 2012) (stating that such agreements are usually
"conditional on judicial approval and subject to judicial modification") [hereinafter Bix].
139. The Illinois Family Law Study Committee's work led to H.B. 1243, which
includes a Proposed Illinois Parentage Act of 2013. H.B. 1243, 98th Il1. Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Ill. 2013) [hereinafter "Proposed Parentage Act"].
140. The Illinois Family Law Study Committee's work led to H.B. 1452, which
included proposed changes to a variety of Illinois statutes governing family matters, includ-
ing the Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, the Alienation of Affections Act, and the
Domestic Violence Act. H.B. 1452, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (111. 2013) [hereinafter
Proposed MDM Act]. The major proposed changes are described in Adam W. Lasker, Is
Family-Law Overhaul on the Way?, 100 ILL. B.J. 458 (2012).
141. See, e.g., Proposed Parentage Act, §204(a)(1) (stating that a man presumed a
parent of a child if "he and the mother . . . are married to each other or are in a state-
recognized civil union and the child is born.., during the marriage or civil union, except as
provided by the Gestational Surrogacy Act or Article 7 of this Act." [Child of Assisted Re-
production]).
142. See, e.g., Proposed MDM, § 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/600 ("Equitable
parent" includes "a person who, though not a legal parent of a child . . . lived with the child
for at least 2 years" while believing to be "the child's biological parent.").
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address similar settings. 43And, unfortunately, the proposals insufficiently
address many of the childcare issues raised by Mancine.
A. PARENTS WITH SUPERIOR RIGHTS
Under Mancine, the parents of children born of sex having superior
rights generally include biological and adoptive parents. 144 Parentage laws
should include others145 who can achieve "de facto parent" or similar status.
1. Current Biological Parents
Biological parents in Illinois now include men whose natural ties are
statutorily presumed, though lacking in reality. Men whose wives naturally
conceive or bear children born of sex are presumed natural parents. 46
Seemingly, there is no presumption (at least statutory) for a man married to
a mother during her pregnancy, but unmarried either at the time of concep-
tion or birth. 47 Where natural ties in the husband are known to be lacking at
birth, or are shown to be lacking thereafter, this presumption can neverthe-
143. Compare, e.g., Proposed Parentage Act, § 204(a)(5) ("[M]an is presumed to be
a parent of a child if... for the first two years of the child's life, he resided in a household
with the child and openly held out the child as his own during that time."), with Proposed
MDM, § 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/600 ("Equitable parent" includes "a person who,
though not a legal parent of the child ... lived with the child since the child's birth or for at
least 2 years, and held himself out as the child's parent while accepting parental responsibili-
ties, under an agreement with the child's legal parent (or, if there are 2 legal parents, both
parents) to rear the child together, each with allocated parental rights and responsibilities,
provided that a court finds that recognition of the person as a parent is in the child's best
interests.").
144. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/2 (under Illinois Parentage Act of 1984,
"parent and child relationship" includes child and "natural or adoptive parents."). The same
general approach has been employed elsewhere, albeit with dissent. See, e.g., Debra H. v.
Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (differing views on the approach, earlier
approved In re Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. App. Ct. 1991)). Biological
and adoptive children have not always been comparably treated. See, e.g., Anderson v. BNY
Mellon, 463 Mass. 299 (2012) (stating that before 1958, adopted children were generally
excluded from many instruments addressing inheritance).
145. Parentage for children not born of sex presents different questions. See, e.g., 750
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/1 et seq. (Gestational Surrogacy Act) (stating that children born to
surrogates may be parented by gametes contributors, 47/20(b)(1)); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 40/3 (stating that a semen donor is treated as natural father of a child conceived via
artificial insemination and born to his wife).
146. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/5(a)(1) ("A man is presumed to be the
natural father of a child if... he and the child's natural mother are or have been married to
each other. . . and the child is born or conceived during such marriage.").
147. Compare Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210. 822(1) ("born during the marriage"), with
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7540 ("child of a wife cohabiting with her husband").
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less continue, at times even when the real natural father,'48 wife, 149 or hus-
band, 150 objects.' 5' There are, for example, statutory standing requirements
148. An alleged real natural father can bring an "action to determine the existence of
the father and child relationship, whether or not such a relationship is presumed." 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/7(a). Under statute, such an action by the alleged "natural parent"
shall only "be barred if brought later than 2 years after the child reaches the age of majority."
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/8(a)(1). Yet the Illinois Supreme Court has suggested that an
alleged natural father who comes in "ten years later," saying "I want a cotton swab, I'm the
dad," would likely lose. In re Parentage of John M., 817 N.E.2d 500, 510 (Il. 2004). In so
suggesting, it urged law reformers seeking greater clarification go to the General Assembly.
Id. at 511; see also In re Marriage of Slayton, 685 N.E.2d 1038 (II1. App. Ct. 1997) (stating
that the real natural father waived objection to ex-husband's request for visitation under
suspect federal constitutional standard). Compare OKLA. STAT. 10, § 3B ("If a child is born
during the course of the marriage and is reared by the husband and wife as a member of their
family without disputing the child's legitimacy for a period of at least two (2) years, the
presumption cannot be disputed by anyone."), with Slowinski v. Sweeney, 64 So. 3d 128
(Fla. App. Dist. Ct. 1st 2011) (stating that the alleged biological father has no statutory
standing to bring paternity suit where marriage and family is intact), and Evans v. Wilson,
856 A.2d 679 (Md. 2004) (similar to Florida's approach).
149. The wife, "the natural mother" under 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/7(b), can
seek solely to rebut a marital paternity presumption, under 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
45/(a)(1) and (2), but only within "2 years after the petitioner obtains knowledge of relevant
facts," 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/8(a)(3); see also Slayton, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 385
(waiver of chance to rebut as objection raised only at end of custody hearing). Rebuttal
perhaps may be sought indirectly, however, in an action by the mother which seeks to de-
termine, on behalf of her child, an alleged natural father's paternity, which itself can be
brought up to 2 years after the child reaches the age of majority, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
45/8(a)(1). Compare LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 185-193 (stating that while husband residing
with wife may "disavow paternity" within a year of when he "learns or should have learned
of the birth," wife may disavow only when she seeks to establish her new husband is the
father), and Clark v. Evans, 254 P.3d 672 (Okla. 2011) (stating that former wife estopped
from rebutting marital presumption seven years after divorce), with In re Custody of D.T.R.,
796 N.W.2d 509, 513 (Minn. 2011) (stating that wife can appeal loss by biological father of
paternity action to husband with a marital presumption, even where the biological father
does not appeal, as she is "an aggrieved party").
150. A husband, a presumed natural father under 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
45/5(a)(1), can seek solely to rebut the presumption, under 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
45/7(b), but only within "2 years after petitioner obtains knowledge of relevant facts," 750
ILCS 45/8(a)(3); see also In re Roberts, 271 I1. App. 3d 972, 981 (4th Dist. 1995) (stating
that husband, who was not biological father, can seek custody when he petitions for marriage
dissolution as long as marital presumption had not been rebutted earlier). Compare UTAH
CODE 7-45(g)-607(1) (stating that a man presumed to be father under marital presumption,
UTAH CODE 78-45(g)-204(l)(a), may challenge "at any time prior to filing an action for
divorce"), and LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 189 (stating that action by husband for disavowal of
marital paternity presumption, under article 184, usually "is subject to a liberative prescrip-
tion of one year"), with MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.57(b) (stating that to declare "nonexistence"
of marital paternity presumption, husband may not sue "later than three years after the
child's birth"). In Illinois, while a husband has two years to seek rebuttal of the marital pre-
sumption, his wife has twenty years to sue the natural father in a paternity action even when
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and time limits for objections.152 The marital presumption operates in Illi-
nois, though not elsewhere, even where the husbands are sterile or living
and sleeping apart from their wives. 153 Incidentally, presumed parentage for
the husband objects because he may lose his parental status in the paternity action. In re
G.M., 2012 IL App (2d) 110370.
151. It seems unclear whether the marital presumption of parentage continues when
only a nonparent, like a grandparent, objects. See, e.g., In re A.K., 620 N.E.2d 572 (111 App.
Ct. 1993) (stating that a great-grandmother objects to child care interests asserted by pre-
sumed, but not natural, father in child abuse proceeding; two Justices recognize voice from
presumed father as consistent "with any ability he might have to adopt," In re A.K., 620
N.E.2d at 989, while a third Justice dissents, finding the state is required to prove the pre-
sumed father unfit in order to obtain an order designating the child as a ward, 620 N.E.2d at
990). Ex parte S.P., 72 So. 3d 1250 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011) (maternal grandmother lacked
standing to disestablish paternity in deceased daughter's husband).
152. In Illinois, the statutory requirements vary by who petitions to rebut the pre-
sumption. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 7(b), (b-5) (stating that an action to declare
nonexistence of parent and child relationship may be brought "by the child, the natural
mother, or a man presumed to be the father"; such an action may also be brought "subse-
quent to an adjudication of paternity in any judgment by the man adjudicated to be the fa-
ther" pursuant to certain statutory presumptions if DNA tests show he is not the natural
father). Compare COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-107(l)(b) ("declaring the nonexistence of
the father and child relationship presumed" due to marriage or attempted marriage, an action
must be "brought within a reasonable time after obtaining knowledge of relevant facts but in
no event later than five years after the child's birth"; for a similar declaration involving a
presumption due to receipt into home and openly holding out the child as one's own, due to
a paternity acknowledgement or due to genetic tests, there are no comparable time limits),
with COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-105(2)(c) (special factors, involving "fraud, duress or
mistake of material fact," are necessary in challenging certain paternity acknowledgements).
See also TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-2-30430(b)(2)(A) (stating that if mother and husband were
married and living together at the time of conception and "halve] remained together...
through the date a petition to establish parentage is filed," and if mother and husband swear
the "husband is the father[,] ... any action seeking to establish parentage must be brought
within twelve (12) months of the birth of the child"; husband and wife are "estopped to deny
paternity in any future action" if they so swear); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.530 (stat-
ing that with certain exceptions, actions to rebut marital paternity presumptions, 26.26.116,
must be "commenced not later than two years after the birth of the child" by "a presumed
father, the mother, or another individual").
Elsewhere, there are also common law doctrines limiting attempts to disestablish statutory
presumptions of parentage. See, e.g., K.E.M. v. P.C.S., 38 A.2d 798, 810 (Pa. 2012) (paterni-
ty by estoppel can bar a mother's husband from denying paternity of a marital child where
the child's best interests are served, perhaps even if there has been no deceit, in an action by
the mother against the biological father for child support).
153. Compare, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/2 (stating that paternity presump-
tion where man is or was married to natural mother when a child born of sex was conceived
or delivered), with CAL. FAM. CODE § 7540 ("[T]he child of a wife cohabiting with her hus-
band, who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a child of the mar-
riage.").
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a husband continues elsewhere even when the biological father timely seeks
to childcare. 1
54
The Proposed Parentage Act in Illinois not only generally maintains
the current marital paternity presumptions' but also extends presumptions
outside of marriage. The proposal, for example, recognizes "parentage" in a
man who is presumed to have natural ties if "for the first 2 years of the
child's life," the man resided "in a household with the child and openly held
out the child as his own during that time."'' 56 This presumption would not
literally cover Nicholas Gansner, as he "had moved in" with Miki only
within a month of William's birth. 5 7 This proposal, with its two year resi-
dency requirement, contains a more limited presumption than has been un-
dertaken elsewhere. 58 For example, in other states, specific habitation peri-
ods are unnecessary.
59
154. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 120 (1989) (stating that con-
clusive marital paternity presumption promotes "family integrity and privacy"). However, it
remains unclear whether the U.S. Supreme Court will rule that all biological fathers have no
"federal constitutional parental prerogatives" when their children are born into intact mar-
riages. Parness & Townsend, supra note 130, at 237-38.
155. The proposal does limit, significantly, the current presumption by covering
children born "during" marriage, but not children "conceived" during marriage. Compare
Proposed Parentage Act, § 204(a)(1) (stating that a man is presumed a parent if a child born
to the mother "during" a marriage or civil union), with 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/5(a)(1)
("A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if: (1) he and the child's natural
mother are or have been married to each other ... and the child is born or conceived during
such marriage .... ).
156. Proposed Parentage Act, § 204(a)(5). Holding out to be something one is not,
and acquiring the status one falsely claims, is not unique to parentage. See, e.g., Small v.
McMaster, 352 S.W.3d 280, 282 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011) (evidencing a Texas statute recogniz-
ing "informal" marriage requires a couple to present "to others that they were married").
There is no "first 2 years" rule in Minnesota or Alabama. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §
257C.08(4) (stating that a minor who resided with a person for 2 years may be subject to a
reasonable visitation order, if the person established "emotional ties creating a parent and
child relationship," if visitation served the child's best interests, and if such visitation
"would not interfere with the relationship between the custodial parent and the child"); ALA.
CODE § 26-17-204(a)(5) (stating that a man receives child into his home, openly holds out
child as his natural child, and "establishes a significant parental relationship").
157. In re Marriage of Mancine, 2012 IL App (1st) 111138 (No. 10 D 9594), 4.
There was no indication in the Appellate or Supreme Court briefs of allegations that William
resided in any way with Nicholas before Nicholas and Miki moved in together.
158. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-5 (A)(4) (stating that the paternity presump-
tion of "natural" fatherhood for a man who "openly holds out the child as his natural child
and has established a personal, financial or custodial relationship with the child"), applied to
a woman in Chatterjee, at 287-288; ALA. CODE § 26-17-204 (a)(5) (stating that the paternity
presumption outside of marriage when man receives child into his home, openly holds child
out as his own, and establishes a significant parental relationship), applied in Ex parte T.J.,
89 So. 3d 744 (Ala. 2012) (stating that the nonbiological father of a child could be presumed
father under this section); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-21 1(4)(b) (6) ("parenting plan" can be
pursued by a nonparent with a "child-parent relationship").
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There are also no current or proposed statutory presumptions in Illi-
nois establishing parentage for men, with or without natural ties, whose
girlfriends bear children and where cohabitation began before birth and
continued thereafter; there was an agreement on dual parentage; and the
couple lived in a unitary family unit.1 60 Further, as there is no common law
marriage in Illinois, there is not much chance for presumed common law
parentage.
161
Extending such parentage to a woman is more problematic for children born of sex, as the
natural mother acquires parental rights simply by giving birth. See, e.g., In re D.S., 207 Cal.
App. 4th 1088, 1092 (2012) (stating the stepmother who received a child to her home, CAL.
FAM. CODE § 761 l(d), nevertheless is not a presumed mother where natural mother objects
though child had been living with natural father; stepmother must seek to adopt to attain
parenthood status where natural mother "abandoned her parental rights and responsibili-
ties"). See also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270 (1)(a) and (b) ("de facto custodian" is a
primary caregiver and financial supporter of a child who resided with the child for more than
6 months if the child is under 3; such custodian has "the same standing in custody matters
that is given to each parent"). Incidentally, in Kentucky, even when nonparents have not
established de facto custodian status, they can pursue custody notwithstanding the superior
right of parents by presenting "clear and convincing" evidence of parental unfitness or waiv-
er of superior rights. Mullins v. Picklesimer, 317 S.W. 3d 569, 578 (Ky. 2010). De facto
custodians were found in, e.g., Ramsey v. Ramsey, 2012 WL 3047210 (Ky. App. 2012)
(stating that the maternal grandparents deemed de facto custodians over their daughter's [the
natural mother's] objection), and Ball v. Tatum, 373 S.W.3d 458 (Ky. App. 2012) (stating
that the maternal grandparents deemed primary residential custodians over mother's objec-
tion).
159. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (d) (stating that receipt of child in home and
openly holding out child as her/his natural child), applied in L.M. v. M.G., 145 Cal. App. 4th
133 (2012) (former lesbian partner is presumed parent of child adopted by her ex-partner
during their cohabitation-though there was no registered domestic partnership); In re Bryan
D., 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d 821 (Cal. App. 2011) (recognizing grandmother may be presumed
parent under Section 7611(d)); In re Jose C., 188 Cal. App. 4th 147, 162 (Cal. App. 2010)
(stating that in dependency proceeding, Section 7611 (d) applies; here, maternal grandfather
was not a "presumed father" though he "acted as the functional equivalent" of child's fa-
ther).
160. Seemingly such statutory presumptions are available to state legislators wishing
to protect "unitary" families under the reasoning of federal constitutional cases like Michael
H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 (1989). This availability, while not yet generally seized
by states, is discussed in Parness & Townsend, supra note 130, at 233-42. Another area of
possible presumptions involves children born to unwed mothers as a result of artificial in-
semination consented to by their intimate partners. In Illinois, such consents do not prompt
parental rights. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/2, 3 (consents available only to husbands).
Yet another possible presumption involves a surrogacy contract between a woman who will
bear a child and an unwed couple who will secure custody and raise the child upon birth. In
Illinois, such surrogacy contracts can be valid if the statutory requirements on consent and
the like are met. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/1 et seq. (Gestational Surrogacy Act, espe-
cially Sections 10 and 20(b)). Outside of Illinois, such surrogacy pacts can be "void and
unenforceable as contrary to public policy." See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.855.
161. See, e.g., Ayala v. Fox, 564 N.E.2d 920 (Ill. App. Ct.1990). Compare IOWA
CODE ANN. § 252A.3 ("A child or children born of parents who held or hold themselves out
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2. Current Adoptive Parents
As for adoption, under Mancine, the superior parental rights with re-
spect to care of children born of sex seemingly arise only when there are
formal adoptions. 62 Intent or agreement to adopt or parental allowance of
childcare by others, if not undertaken under the statutory adoption scheme,
are irrelevant in later childcare disputes.
While the Mancine court rejected any use by Nicholas of an "equitable
adoption" doctrine, 63 the court did recognize that the theory of "contract to
adopt" is available in other cases where there has been no formal adoption.
What distinguishes the cases? Simply put, a "contract to adopt" theory may
be used in Illinois under Mancine only where the children subject to the
adoption contracts may be benefitted financially by the demise of their in-
tended adopters. 64 In Mancine, two high court cases were distinguished. In
each, the property of intended adopters, who died intestate and who had
contracted with the birth parents to adopt, was available to the intended
adoptees as child heirs. 65 As well, in Mancine, while the court said no
"contract to adopt" could establish the intended adopters as parents with
standing to sue for the wrongful deaths of the intended adoptees, 66 it did
as husband and wife by virtue of a common law marriage are deemed the legitimate child or
children of both parents."), with Small v. McMaster, 352 S.W.3d 280, 282 (14th Dist. Ct.
App. 2011) (applying Texas Family Code 2.401(a), which court describes as recognizing an
"informal or common-law marriage"), and Clark Sand Co., Inc. v. Kelly, 60 So. 3d 149, 157
(Ala. 2011) (stating that elements of a common law marriage do not necessarily include
"ceremony or particular words," citing Boswell v. Boswell, 497 So. 2d 479, 480 (Ala.
1986)). Even where there was common law marriage, there need not be common law parent-
age (i.e., no parentage without biological ties or formal adoption per statute). There is also
no statute in Illinois recognizing a marriage that is not solemnized as legal and valid. UTAH
CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5 (stating that man and woman have a contract and hold themselves out
as husband and wife).
162. Superior parental rights for children not born of sex may arise without marital
presumptions or adoptions. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/25 (stating that in cer-
tain settings, gestational surrogacy contracts are enforceable).
163. In re Marriage of Mancine, 2012 IL App (I st) 111138, 31-34.
164. The Mancine court also concluded the contract to adopt theory was unavailable
"because here there was no contract to adopt." Id. 32. This conclusion was not explained
and, for me, is contradicted by Nicholas's allegations as to his arrangements with Miki about
his adoption of William after the marriage.
165. Id. 32; Monahan v. Monahan, 14 Il.2d 449, 453 (1958) (stating that oral con-
tract must be proven by "clear and convincing" evidence; though intended adopters were
advised their intended son could be provided for by will [as no formal adoption was possible
given the son's age-incidentally, bad legal advice], the absence of any will did not estop the
intended son); Dixon Nat. Bank of Dixon v. Neal, 5 Ill.2d 328, 335 (1955) (stating that an
agreement to adopt established "clearly and positively").
166. In re Marriage of Mancine, 2012 IL App (1st) 111138, 33; In re Estate of
Edwards, 106 11. App. 3d 635 (1982) (stating that intended adopters were not "next of kin"
under statute) [Edwards].
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not say that intended adoptees who could prove a "contract to adopt" could
not pursue wrongful death claims involving intended adopters. 167 So, adop-
tion contracts can lead to parentage only for those people who die where
any intended children benefit financially. 168 Contracts to adopt cannot, in
the absence of formal adoption, lead to childcare opportunities for willing,
able, and living intended parents, meaning that any intended adopted chil-
dren do not have the chance to benefit when the intended parents remain
living. Here, the superior rights of biological or adoptive parents (like Miki)
are secured, though these parents may have invited nonparents to childrear
and though the intended parents, children, and others (like intended sib-
lings) are often significantly harmed by the terminations of "established
familial or family-like bonds. 169
By contrast, the superior parental rights of a mother are waivable via
nonadoption contracts in certain artificial reproduction settings.170 Under
Mancine, nonadoption prebirth contracts by willing, nongenetic, married
parents in assisted reproduction settings differ from nonadoption postbirth
contracts by willing, nongenetic parents, like Nicholas, in settings where
children are born of sex, adopted, or born via assisted reproduction. Should
it only matter how children came into the world? Should it matter whether
the willing parent has genetic ties if the child is born of sex? Should it mat-
ter whether the willing parent is married? Consents to childrear, together
with assessments of children's welfare, should matter when courts decide
167. In re Marriage of Mancine, 2012 IL App (1st) 111138, 33-34 (citing Ed-
wards, 106 Ill. App. 3d 635). While the Edwards court said "the wrongful death statute...
is to be strictly construed," it recognized both that the "contract to adopt" theory could be
applied in the intestate cases where intended adoptees sought to recover and that an intended
adoptee, or at least his/her biological parent who orally contracts for adoption, can sue to
obtain "enforcement of contract rights." Edwards, 106 Ill. App. 3d at 638. See also In re
Marriage of Mancine, 2012 IL App (1st) 111138, 33 ("[O]ral contract to adopt merely
permits the enforcement of contract rights," presumably by the intended adoptees, and "does
not create a parent-child relationship or afford all of the legal consequences of a statutory
adoption," presumably to the intended adopters.).
168. On the need to recognize greater financial benefits for the children of unmarried
parents and of stepparents, even without contracts to adopt, see Cynthia Grant Bowman, The
New Illegitimacy: Children of Cohabiting Couples and Stepchildren, 20 J. GENDER, SOC.
POL'Y & L. 437 (2012) (discussing inheritance, government benefits, and standing to bring a
number of tort claims).
169. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 88 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting
children may have "fundamental liberty interests" in "preserving" such bonds).
170. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/3(a) (2010) (stating that only a husband who
consents will be "treated in law if he were the natural father of a child" conceived when she
was "inseminated artificially with semen donated by a man not her husband"). Such
nongenetic consenting parents may also need to include lesbians whose partners (in and
outside of state-recognized relationships like marriage and civil unions) deliver children
from assisted reproduction where the lesbians consented. See, e.g., Shineovich v. Shineovich
214 P.3d 29, 39-40 (Or. App. Ct. 2009) (equal protection denial due to sexual orientation).
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issues of parentage and allocations of childcare responsibilities. In Califor-
nia, a man or a woman, whether or not married to a parent, is a presumed
second parent of a child for childcare purposes whether the child is born of
sex or assisted reproduction, as long as the man or woman receives the
child into the home and openly "holds out" as being the second parent.17
Where the second parent in such settings does not wish to childrear any
longer, the child's initial parent may even be able to pursue child support. 72
3. More Parents with Superior Rights
i. Other State Experiences
Elsewhere, parentage for children born of sex is extended to some with
no actual or presumed biological ties and with no formal adoptions. 173 At
times, extensions come via precedents, as in Wisconsin where case law
recognizes "psychological parent" or "second parent" status. 174 But, often
there are statutes, a preferred approach for those concerned about inappro-
priate judicial lawmaking. 
175
Some state statutes recognize parentage that is dependent upon the
biological or adoptive parent's consent as well as upon earlier childrearing.
For example, in Delaware, by statute, a de facto parent can be judicially
recognized for one who had "a parent-like relationship" with "the support
and consent of the child's parent"; who exercised "parental responsibility";
and who "acted in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have es-
tablished a bonded and dependent relationship with the child that is parental
171. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (2012), construed in Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117
P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005) (former lesbian partner is second parent to child born of assisted repro-
duction).
172. See, e.g., H.M. v. E.T., 906 N.Y.S.2d 85 (N.Y. App. 2010) (stating that a lesbi-
an's implied promise to support child later conceived and born to former partner supports a
claim by former partner for child support).
173. Herein, the other noted state statutes and precedents on parentage and nonparent
childcare are assumed to meet the Troxel standards on losses or diminishments of superior
parental rights, whatever those standards may be. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 75. Some non-
Illinois laws seem of questionable validity. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-1(b.1) (2010)
(stating that in disputes over custody between parents and, e.g., grandparents, aunts or sib-
lings, "parental power may be lost" if a court, exercising "sound discretion and taking into
consideration all the circumstances . . . determines" such losses serve the children's best
interest, though there is "a rebuttable presumption" favoring parental custody).
174. In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995) (stating that consent,
parent-like relationship, financial support, and "bonded, dependent relationship are parental
in nature").
175. See, e.g., Appellee Brief for Petitioner-Appellee at 21-23, In re Marriage of
Mancine v. Gansner, 2012 IL App (1st) 111138 (No. 10-D-9394) ("It is clearly within the
legislature's sphere of authority to decide who has standing to ask for custody and who has
standing to seek visitation.").
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in nature." 176 And in the District of Columbia, by written law, one might
seek "third-party custody" as a "de facto parent" if one lived with the child
since birth or lived in the same household with the child for at least ten (10)
of the twelve (12) months preceding the filing of one's custody request.
177
Elsewhere, there are also statutes on natural parentage presumptions
that are not dependent upon marriage 78 and are not necessarily rebutted
when a lack of natural ties is proven. Some establish a minimum time peri-
od of childcare. For example, in Missouri, a man "shall be presumed to be
the natural father of a child if. . . . [h]e is obligated to support the child
pursuant to a written voluntary promise." 179 In Minnesota, a man is "pre-
sumed to be the biological father of a child if ... [w]hile the child is under
the age of majority, he receives the child into his home and openly holds
out the child as his biological child."'1 80 In Indiana, there is a comparable
"rebuttable presumption," but it must include "the consent of the child's
mother"' 81 and a positive genetic test. 182 In Alabama, a statute requires "a
significant parental relationship with the child" involving emotional and
176. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(a)(4) (2009) (mother), § 8-201(b)(6) (2009)
(father), § 8-201(c) (2009) (stating the three factors to attain "[d]e facto parent status"). But
see In re Bancroft v. Jameson, 19 A.3d 730 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2010) (finding statute overbroad
and violative of fit mother's and father's due process rights as relates to the mother's boy-
friend).
177. D.C. CODE § 16-831.01 (2012) and § 831.03 (2012) (with parental "agree-
ment").
178. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-105(1)(d) (2008) (stating that while child is a
minor, a man is the presumed natural father if he "receives the child into his home" and
"openly holds out the child as his natural child"); see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (d) (2012),
construed in S.Y. v. S.B., 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1 (Cal. App. 2011) (including same-sex female
partners); see also IND. CODE § 31-14-7-2(a) (2012) (presuming the same but with the need
for the child's mother's consent).
179. Mo. REv. STAT. § 210.822 (2012). This obligation seemingly can arise without
"court order," as such an order is another way the obligation prompting a presumption can
arise. Id. Where two conflicting presumptions arise via conduct in Missouri, the controlling
presumption is the one "founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic." Mo.
REv. STAT. § 210.822.2 (2012). Comparably, there is a presumption in Kansas where a man
"notoriously or in writing recognizes paternity," which need not involve a voluntary paterni-
ty acknowledgement. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1114(a)(4) (2012).
180. MrNN. STAT. § 257.55(d) (2012). Where two presumptions arise via conduct in
Minnesota, the controlling presumption is the one "founded on the weightier considerations
of policy and logic." MIN. STAT. § 257.55(2) (2012). Similar are the presumptions arising
under MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-105(d) (2011) and COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-4-105(1)(d)
(2008).
181. IND. CODE § 31-14-7-2 (2012).
182. IND. CODE § 31-14-7-2(b) (2012) (stating that the "rebuttable presumption" does
"not establish the man's paternity"; paternity may only be established via IND. CODE § 31-
14-2-1(3) (2012), which requires a positive genetic test in the absence of a marriage or at-
tempted marriage).
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financial support. 183 In Wyoming, a man "is presumed to be the father of a
child if ... [f]or the first two (2) years of the child's life, he resided in the
same household with the child and openly held out the child as his own."'1
84
Where natural ties are statutorily presumed, the lack of ties will not neces-
sarily result in a rebuttal of the presumption.'85
ii. Adaptations in Illinois
In the Mancine assessment of biological or adoptive parenthood for
William, the parenthood of any other children in the same household
seemed irrelevant. In the case, Nicholas evidently did not seek a court order
so he could continue to care for Elizabeth, though she allegedly called him
"'Daddy"' (while Miki's first husband was called "Daddy John").1 86 Fur-
ther, Miki evidently conceded that "Nicholas was a fit and proper person to
share Henry's joint custody with her."1 87 Any further intrusions into superi-
or parental rights, perhaps founded on other state experiences, should re-
quire that courts take into account sibling relationships. 88 Thus, in future
cases, the ties between William, Henry, and Elizabeth should be examined
in assessing childcare for William.'8 9
183. ALA. CODE § 26-17-204(a)(5) (2009).
184. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-504(a)(v) (2011). Similar is TEX. FAM. CODE
§160.204(a)(5) (2011) and DEL. CODE. ANN. 13 § 8-204(a)(5) (2009).
185. See, e.g., Alisha C. v. Jeremy C., 808 N.W.2d 875, 884-885 (Neb. 2012) (stating
that former husband, under NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1412.01 (2012), may set aside earlier
divorce court finding of presumed marital paternity, but only if in the child's best interests,
there was no adoption, and the husband did not acknowledge paternity while "knowing he
was not the father").
186. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent-Appellant at 10, In re Marriage of Mancine v.
Gansner, 2012 IL App (1st) 111138 (No. I0-D-9394).
187. Id. at 16. Henry was born on September 16, 2009, after the Nicholas-Miki mar-
riage in May 2009, making Henry simultaneously adoptable by Nicholas and Miki under
Wisconsin law, see also id. at 9 (Nicholas and Miki moved up their wedding to May 21,
2009, "to prevent any issues" for their adoption of Henry).
188. Compare Pettaway v. Savage, 87 A.D. 3d 796 (N.Y. Sup. App. 2011) (stating
that nonparent custodian, who lived with the child's now deceased mother and child's half-
sister, awarded sole custody of the child, with visitation to biological father, as there were
"extraordinary circumstances," including the child's relationship with her sister), with CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(c)(1)(B)(v) (2012) (stating that termination of parental rights
may be avoided by parent when it is shown that such termination would substantially inter-
fere with an existing sibling relationship), and MINN. STAT. §§ 257c.03(1), 257c.03(6)(b)(6),
257c.03(7)(b)(7) (2012) (stating that when "interested third party" or a "de facto" custodian
petitions for child custody, court must consider whether the sibling of the child is already in
the care of the petitioner).
189. See, e.g., In re D.C., 4 A.3d 1004 (N.J. 2010) (stating that per statute, siblings
can petition for visitation with their brothers and sisters who have been adopted by nonrela-
tives, subject to the avoidance of harm standard); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2733(b) (2011)
("Where siblings have been freed for adoption through the termination of parental rights...
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Equally irrelevant in Mancine were the relationships between William
and a nonsibling who was not a (quasi) parent, like Nicholas's father, 90 but
who may have grown close in a family way. Exploration of any intrusion
into Miki's superior rights should take into account the effects on
nonsiblings, at least when family bonds were invited by the only parent,
like Miki, with superior rights.
Further, relationships between children, siblings, and other nonparents
should be considered simultaneously, not seriatim, when superior parental
rights and their waivers or exceptions are assessed for multiple children
sharing common familial bonds. 9 In doing so, courts would recognize that
"the conventional nuclear family ... is simply not the structure or prevail-
ing condition in many households."'
9 2
(1) Expanded Acknowledgements
Beside adaptions of other states' laws on de facto and presumed par-
entage and on contracts to adopt, additional parents with superior rights
around the time of birth could be recognized in Illinois via expanded oppor-
tunities for voluntary acknowledgments of parentage (VAPs). Currently in
Illinois, and in other American states, VAPs are chiefly employed by un-
married, heterosexual couples having children born of sex, wherein both the
mothers and the purported fathers sign and file forms postbirth with gov-
ernment. Usually, the forms expressly indicate the signers' beliefs that the
acknowledging men are natural (or biological or genetic) parents. 193 Yet, at
times, VAPs are used and continue to determine legal paternity when the
and the prospective adoptive parent is not adopting all the siblings, each sibling who is under
18 years of age shall be represented by a guardian ad litem in the development of an agree-
ment."); MICH. CT. R. 3.204(A)(3) (2012) ("[w]henever possible," one child's parenting time
case "shall be administered" with the parenting time cases of any other children of the same
parents).
190. Allegedly, and undisputed by Miki in her Appellate Court brief, William was
named, in part, after Nicholas's father whose pictures appeared in family photos in "Wil-
liam's cubby in his classroom." Brief for Respondent-Appellant at 6, 12, In re Marriage of
Mancine v. Gansner, 2012 IL App (1st) 111138 (No. 10-D-9394).
191. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212(c) (2011) (stating that in determining "the parent-
ing plan in accordance with the best interest of the child," the court shall consider "the inter-
action and interrelationship of the child with the child's . . . siblings and with any other
person who significantly affects the child's best interests").
192. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 98 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
193. There are a few states allowing prebirth filings and other states that do not ex-
plicitly require the signers' beliefs as to natural ties. See Jeffrey A. Pamess & Zachary
Townsend, For Those Not John Edwards: More and Better Paternity Acknowledgments at
Birth, 40 U. BALT. L. REv. 53, 70-82 (2010) [hereinafter Parness & Townsend, Not John
Edwards].
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beliefs are shown to be mistaken or even when there were no, or only sin-
gular, beliefs at the time of signing as to natural ties.
94
Explicit expansions of VAP opportunities in the mates of birth moth-
ers and birth fathers who have no natural ties might be characterized as new
forms of adoption. They could be made available to both opposite sex and
same sex couples, formally unrecognized by government, when one mem-
ber of the couple has a child born of sex. 95 They could be made available
shortly before birth. 96 But, postbirth availability is the better approach. In
fact, VAP opportunities should best come only after the mates with no natu-
ral ties have actually childreared for some designated time. VAP comple-
tion would then effectively allow a de facto parent to gain parental status
under law. Superior parental rights would not be infringed as the mates with
natural ties would need to have invited the nonparent to childrear and sign
the VAPs.' 97
As compared to traditional postbirth adoptions, any such VAPs should
have less-but still some-governmental oversight." For example, VAPs
should not be made available when children already have two parents under
194. See, e.g., Leslie Joan Harris, Voluntary Acknowledgments of Parentage for
Same-Sex Couples, 20 J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 467 (2012); see also Woodell v.
Lagerquist, No. 2121-11-3, 2012 WL 5866481 (Va. App. Salem Nov. 20, 2012) (cohabiting
opposite-sex couple); see also Parness & Townsend, Not John Edwards, supra note 193, at
72 ("Several state paternity-acknowledgment forms, including those in Alaska and Nevada,
do not address whether genetic ties are required, or even preferred, to establish paternity.").
195. State-recognized couples live within a marriage, civil union or domestic part-
nership allowed by state law. For an argument that state-recognized couples should also arise
under a "registered contractual relationship," see Erez Aloni, Registering Relationships,
TUL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-2135562.
196. If operative before birth, availability should occur only postviability where
postviable abortion rights are not recognized. This would respect women's reproductive
choices. As well, it would be more likely that the acknowledging parents intend to and will
childrear the later-born children then, when acknowledgements occur earlier (as a couple's
relationship may change during pregnancy).
197. By comparison, there are reasons to allow unwed male mates with actual or
possible natural ties to complete VAPs sooner, even before birth. At least where the ex-
pectant or actual mothers are unwed, the unwed males have paternity opportunity interests.
See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261-62 (1983). These interests can, and should,
be permitted to be seized by, for example, VAPs, even prebirth. See, e.g., Parness & Town-
send, Not John Edwards, supra note 193, at 97 ("Third-trimester acknowledgments are less
likely to interfere" with "constitutional privacy interests of expectant mothers.").
198. The superior parental rights or parental preference doctrines under state laws
recognize parents usually childrear in fashions that serve their children's best interests. Yet,
parental decision making is not unfettered because of "the courts' role as guardians of the
best interests of children" this role is "vouchsafed only when . . . state-created processes
relating to parental status are followed." Bix, supra note 138, at 12. State processes for vol-
untary parentage acknowledgments should promote informed and voluntary parental acces-
sions of their superior rights to others as well as and the informed and voluntary consents by
these others who will childrear.
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law; when the mate with no natural ties has a record of child abuse or aban-
donment; or when either one of the mates has not earlier received inde-
pendent counseling, or at least information as to the effects of a VAP. 199
There should also be rescission options, as well as avenues for challenges
by natural fathers or others claiming childcare interests who were unin-
formed about and excluded through no personal fault from the earlier VAP
establishments.200
New VAP opportunities would be unnecessary, perhaps, if expedited
adoptions were permitted. For example, in Wyoming, upon finding "the
best interest and welfare of the child," a court may enter a final decree of
adoption "if the child has resided in the home of the petitioner for six (6)
months. 20 1
(2) Family Relations Contracts
As well, there could be additional nonadoptive and nonbiological par-
ents via family relations contracts, which could include pacts expressly or
implicitly allowed by statutes on premarriage, midmarriage, and marriage
separation pacts. For example, in premarital agreements, single parents (i.e.,
where a child has one parent) could be permitted to agree that their future
spouses become second parents after some time, assuring childcare interests
for the second parents and child support for the children. 2  Individual con-
199. Compare, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-307(1 1)(a)(iii) (2012) (An abused or
neglected child, removed from parental authority, can only be placed with "a noncustodial
parent or a relative of the child" after court conducts "a criminal background check."). Fail-
ure to comply with process requirements should prompt possible sanction, including crimi-
nal prosecution and loss of caretaking status, thereby deterring deceit.
200. For an expanded argument on the need for more VAP opportunities for unwed
fathers with natural ties, see Parness & Townsend, Not John Edwards, supra note 193, at 92-
104.
201. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-22-11 l(a)(iii) (2011), applied in In re Adoption of SDL,
278 P.3d 242 (Wyo. 2012).
202. The Illinois Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/4(8)
(State Bar Edition 2011), recognizes premarital pacts can cover "personal rights and obliga-
tions, not in violation of public policy or a statute imposing a criminal penalty." At least
some parental waivers of superior rights, as by stepparent adoptions, are not violative of the
public policy and do not constitute crimes. Premarital pacts, however, cannot adversely
affect the "right of a child to support." 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/8(b) (State Bar Edition
2011). While the Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act, as of July, 2012, initially
addresses only contracts involving "rights or obligations arising between spouses because of
their marital status," § 2(4), it later states that "a term ... which defines the rights or duties
of the parties regarding custodial responsibility [defined to include "legal custody, parenting
time, access, visitation or other custodial right of duty"] is not binding on the court," thus
suggesting custodial responsibility pacts can be binding with judicial approval, § 10(a) and
(c). The Comment to § 10 recognizes a court might consider a custodial responsibility pact
"by way of guidance." See also In re Marriage of Neuchterlein, 587 N.E.2d 21, 25 (111. App.
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tract validity and enforcement issues would be made subject to judicial re-
view.
Further, in the absence of express or implicit statutory recognition,
there could be additional parents via common law family relations contracts
between those who may or may not be formally wed, domestically part-
nered, or unionized.2 °3 Expanding upon high court precedent enforcing
common law contracts on child support between unmarried, opposite-sex
couples involving artificial inseminations leading to births,204 an Illinois
appellate court, in its second ruling in In re TP.S. in October 2012, recog-
nized common contract law and promissory estoppel claims involving cus-
tody or visitation, as well as support, on behalf of a former same-sex female
partner whose one-time mate conceived and bore a child via artificial in-
semination. 20 5 Earlier appellate court decisions rejecting common law con-
tracts to adopt and similar theories were distinguished as not involving
births by artificial insemination.20 6 Should the acts prompting the births
Ct.1992) (premarital agreement to raise children born into marriage as Lutherans is not
always enforceable, but the agreement may be considered "as a factor" in the "custody deci-
sion").
203. See, e.g., Smith v. Carr, No. CV 12-3251-CAS (JCGx), 2012 WL 3962904
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2012) (exploring childcare pacts between the unwed in light of Marvin
v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976), while recognizing a written agreement for partner
support might be enforceable as long as it is not premised on meretricious consideration) and
Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 434 ("[W]e conclude that public policy considerations
do not prohibit a court from relying on its equitable powers to grant visitation apart from sec.
767.245 on the basis of a co-parenting agreement between a biological parent and another
when visitation is in a child's best interest."). Compare Christian R.H., 794 N.W.2d at 233-
34 n.7 (stating while there is common law authority to order child "visitation," there is no
nonstatutory authority to confer "parental rights"). In Illinois already, when certain children
are not born of sex, but of assisted reproduction, certain parents can contract under statute to
become parents though they have no biological ties. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/3(a)
(State Bar Edition 2010) (upon consent husband of artificially inseminated wife will often be
"treated in law as if he were the natural father of a child thereby conceived" even if he was
not the semen donor); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20(b) (State Bar Edition 2010) (stating two
people can become parents under an agreement governed by the Gestational Surrogacy Act
if one contributes "at least one of the gametes resulting in a pre-embryo that the gestational
surrogate will attempt to carry to term.").
204. In re Parentage of M.J., 203 Ill.2d 526 (2003).
205. In re T.P.S., 2012 IL App (5th) 120176 [hereinafter T.P.S. II].
206. T.P.S. II, 11. Outside of Illinois comparable contracts involving children not
born of sex are also validated at times under common law principles, see, e.g., S.N. v. M.B.,
935 N.E.2d 463 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010) (common law guidelines on enforceable surrogacy
contracts). At other times, common law contracts are unenforceable. See, e.g., Recent Cases:
Family Law, 118 HARV. L. REv. 1039 (2005) (noting the tensions between T.F. v. B.L., 813
N.E.2d 1244 (Mass. 2004) (no support obligation for nonbirth mother for child born of arti-
ficial insemination arising from implied contract between same-sex female couple) and
E.N.O. v. L.MM, 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999) ("de facto" parenthood recognized in same-
sex partner who sought child visitation).
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matter so much? In T.P.S., it was urged that there had been no formal adop-
tion by the non-birth mother only because she and her mate were told that
adoption was not legally possible.20 7
Expanded family relations contracts seem far more problematic than
expanded VAP opportunities. Those undertaking such contracts currently
have little opportunity for securing court approval of the contracts in ad-
vance of any disputes between the contractors. Thus, they are less like mar-
riage separation agreements, which are often incorporated into marriage
dissolution judgments,2 °8 and more like cohabitation pacts, which are not
recognized currently in Illinois. By contrast, expanded VAPs, like current
VAPs, could be deemed to have "the full force and effect of a judgment, 2 °9
as there is governmental recognition at the time of signing, something not
usually occurring with family relations contracts.
(3) Expanded Guardianships
Beside adaptations of other state laws, expanded VAPs, or newly rec-
ognized family relations contracts, earlier guardianship appointments by
courts2 10 could be more broadly available to establish parentage, or at least
standing to seek to childcare over a parent's objections, when intimate part-
ner relationships end. Thus, in its initial ruling in the T.P.S. case, a lesbian
partner, who had been appointed guardian of each of the two children born
to her then mate, was allowed to seek continuation of the guardianships
under the Illinois Probate Act once the two women ended their relation-
ship.21' The birth mother's earlier consents to guardianship overcame the
presumptions of superior parental rights,212 giving her former partner "a
207. Brief for Catherine D.W. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner-Appellant at 4,
Catherine D.W. v. Deanna C.S., 2012 IL App (5th) 120176 (No. 2012-F-2).
208. See, e.g., In re Coulter, 2012 IL 113474, 17 (Illinois Marriage and Dissolution
of Marriage Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/502(d)-(e) (2010) (stating a joint parenting agree-
ment set forth, or incorporated by reference, in a judgment is "enforceable as both an order
of the court and as a contract," while such an agreement without either attribute "is merely
identified and approved" and "must be enforced as a contract").
209. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/6(b) (State Bar Edition 2010) (stating paternity estab-
lished via VAP can serve "as a basis for seeking a child support order without any further
proceedings to establish paternity").
210. Court-appointed guardians thus differ from folks like Nicholas whose girl-
friends/wives name them as sole guardians in adoption papers when adoption petitions are
pending. See In re Marriage of Mancine, 2012 IL App (1st) 111138 (No. 10 D 9594), 4-5
(explaining Nicholas was named sole guardian of William by Miki, as reflected in adoption
agent's report of February 27, 2009, involving Miki's proposed adoption of William; the
adoption was finalized in March 2009).
211. InreT.P.S.,2Oll lLApp (5th) 100617 (No. 5-10-0617), 18.
212. Id. 17.
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cognizable interest" in the children's welfare. 3 To end the guardianship,
the court held the birth mother would only prevail if she showed, by a "pre-
ponderance of the evidence, . . . a material change in the circumstances,"
"unless the guardian establishes, by clear and convincing evidence, that
termination of the guardianship would not be in the best interests of the
[child]. 214
As well, additional guardianship opportunities could be extended to
those, like grandparents, who are not involved in intimate partner relation-
ships with parents. Consider, for example, guardianships vesting custody in
family members that are stipulated to by parents facing possible parental
rights terminations. 5 Such stipulations could include "the equivalent of a
reunification service plan" that would allow the parents to regain custody or
undertake other new court-authorized childcare.216
Thus, guardianships, whether pursuant to new statutes or case prece-
dents utilizing "implied" authority from the current Probate Code provi-
sions, 21 could lead to childcare orders in Illinois on behalf of those ap-
pointed guardians who act as parents. Such orders would need to serve the
213. Id.
214. Id. 16 (quoting the Probate Act provision, effective January 1, 2011, found at
755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-14.1(b)). It should be noted that when the T.P.S. case returned to
the appeals court after a remand, about sixteen months later, the court-in an opinion au-
thored by a Justice who had not participated in the initial ruling-focused on common law
contract and promissory estopped theories, and not on the coguardianship agreements to
recognize the nonbiologial and nonadoptive parent's standing to seek childrearing. In re
T.P.S., 2012 IL App (5th) 120176, 61.
215. See, e.g., Yuba Cnty. Health and Human Servs. v. R.K., No. C070564, 2012
WL 6013184 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2012) (distinguishing consensual and contested guard-
ianships sought by nonparents); In re Kaylee H., 139 Cal. Rptr. 3d 867 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012)
(guardianship in nonparent with parental consent).
216. Compare, e.g., In re A.S.A., 279 P.3d 419 (Utah Ct. App. 2012) (such stipula-
tions nullify parental superior rights, though parents can regain childcare interests when
children can be safely returned), with In re B.R.D., 280 P.3d 78 (Col. Ct. App. 2012) ("We
are aware that mother and father seek to modify a long-term arrangement under which the
couple [prospective adoptees], with the mother's and father's consent, have assumed a sig-
nificant measure of control and care of the boy, and that they have strong bonds with him.
However, we perceive nothing within the circumstances of this case that ... would other-
wise call for an elevation of the presumption favoring established custodial environments
over the Troxel presumption [of superior parental rights].").
217. See, e.g., Karbin v. Karbin, 2012 IL 112815 ("implied" authority for guardian of
"disabled" adult to seek a marriage dissolution on behalf of the ward). But see In re M.M.,
156 I11. 2d 53, 63-64 (1993) ("implied" guardianship authority, empowering child guardians
to consent to adoptions allowing continuing contacts with biological parents and their fami-
lies, is not recognized; here, there must be express statutory authority since "traditional
common law" powers cannot be transcended); In re C.C., 2011 IL 111795, 41 (guardian-
ship statute applied "as written"; courts should "not carve out exceptions that do not appear
in the statute simply because [courts] do not like how the statute applies in a given case").
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basic goals of the Probate Code, chiefly involving the promotion of the best
interests of the wards.218
The statutory and nonstatutory opportunities for nonparents to be des-
ignated child guardians, and thereafter obtain judicially-authorized child-
care responsibilities over parental objections, have already been increased
in Illinois over the years. 2'9 Today, even without parental consent, a guardi-
an may be appointed for a minor where there is no living parent "who is
willing and able to make and carry-out day-to-day childcare decisions con-
cerning the minor" or where "the parent or parents voluntarily relinquished
physical custody of the minor."
220
B. EXCEPTIONS TO SUPERIOR PARENTAL RIGHTS
Besides guardians, certain stepparents,221 grandparents,222 and decep-
tions about male biological ties, 223 should there be other exceptions allow-
ing certain nonbiological and nonadoptive caregivers in Illinois to continue
to childrear as nonparents over parental objections? Should such exceptions
arise even where there were no earlier court orders recognizing the chil-
drearing?224 Are exceptions warranted when there were earlier family rela-
tions contracts that prompted nonbiological and nonadoptive caregivers to
childrear, even when such contracts do not lead to parental status? If so,
218. Karbin, 2012IL 112815, 49.
219. In re Guardianship of Tatyanna T., 2012 IL App (1st) 112957, 20-27.
220. Id. 20 (citing 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-5(b), which establishes a rebuttable
presumption that a parent can make and carry out child care decisions; the presumption can
be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence).
221. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/607(b)(1.5) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 97-
1169 of the 2012 Reg. Sess., and through P.A. 98-2 of the 2013 Reg. Sess.) (stepparent visits
can be ordered during marriage dissolution proceeding if stepparent lived with child for at
least five years and child is at least twelve years old).
222. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/607(a-5)(3) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 97-
1169 of the 2012 Reg. Sess., and through P.A. 98-2 of the 2013 Reg. Sess.) (grandparent
visitation order only where grandparent shows parent's objections "are harmful to the child's
mental, physical, or emotional health"), applied in Flynn v. Henkel, 880 N.E.2d 166 (Ill.
2007) and In re Anaya R., 2012 IL App (I st) 121101.
223. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Mancine, 2012 IL App (1st) 111138, 18 (citing
Koelle v. Zwiren, 284 Ill. App. 3d 778, 784 (1996)).
224. Things are different where there was an earlier consent decree allowing contin-
ued grandparent visits over parental objection, though "changed circumstances" could be
used to end all visits. See, e.g., In re M.M.D., 213 I11. 2d 105, 108-09 (2004) (consolidated
cases involving maternal grandparents seeking guardianship of deceased daughter's child
with unwed biological father wherein parties earlier agreed to consent order awarding per-
manent custody to father and recognizing grandparents' "specific and detailed visitation
rights, telephone access to the child, information about the child's education and medical
care, and authorization to speak with child's teachers, school personnel, counselors and
physicians").
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later parental objections could be made to yield to children's best interests,
rather than to yield only when there is likely harm to children if nonparent
childcare is ended.
Such caregivers, excepted from superior parental rights, could include
additional stepparents, grandparents (i.e., beyond those covered by current
statutes), aunts, cousins, or siblings. 225 How about including a long-time
live-in boyfriend, girlfriend, or friend (i.e., no sexual relationship)2 26 of the
biological or adoptive parent?
227
The U.S. Supreme Court has not spoken since Troxel on the limits of
any additional nonparent childrearing over parental objection. But, some
individual opinions in Troxel suggest there are others who could be permit-
ted to childrear notwithstanding parental objections. In Troxel, nonparent
visitation opportunities were deemed possible by the plurality, perhaps
without a showing of potential harm;228 by Justice Stevens, if there was
statute with "a plainly legitimate sweep"; 229 by Justice Scalia, as long as it
was the legislature and not the courts who crafted the "gradations" of non-
parents "who may have some claim against the wishes of the parents";
230
and by Justice Kennedy, as long as the nonparent had acted "in a caregiving
role over a significant period of time.,
231
Outside Illinois, there are state laws recognizing childcare acts
prompting nonparent childcare interests notwithstanding parental objec-
225. Consider the unusual case of Palmer v. Burnett, 384 S.W.2d 204 (Ky. Ct. App.
2012) (a biological birth mother, who gave up her child for adoption by the maternal grand-
mother, later denied grandparent visitation standing for nonparent visits with the child of her
daughter; the birth mother then was only an aunt as she had become her own daughter's
stepsister).
226. See, e.g., E.C. v. J.V., 136 Cal. Rptr. 3d 339 (Ct. App. 3d 2012) (girlfriend of
mother could seek parental status, assuming she received child into her home and openly
held out child as her "natural child," even though she may not have been having sex with the
mother when the child was born).
227. In some places, nonparents can acquire childcare opportunities where parents
can delegate to them the parents' childcare interests. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. 61.13002(2)
(where a parent in the military cannot comply with time-sharing childcare order due to mili-
tary duties, "parent may designate a person or persons to exercise time-sharing with the child
on the parent's behalf," with any such designation "limited to a family member, a stepparent,
or a relative of the child by marriage"); Ronald H. Kauffman, Bleeding Grandparent Visita-
tion Rights, FLA. B.J. Sept./Oct. 2012, at 42, 42.
228. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 73, 77 (2000).
229. Id. at 85 (internal quotation marks omitted).
230. Id. at 93.
231. Id. at 98; see also id. at 100-01 ("In short, a fit parent's right vis-A-vis a com-
plete stranger is one thing; her right vis-A-vis another parent or a de facto parent may be
another.").
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tions.232 These laws often recognize that certain parental acts-not amount-
ing to abuse, neglect, or abandonment-can waive, or cause the loss of su-
perior parental rights. These laws, constituting exceptions to the superior
parental rights doctrine, are often comparable to other American state laws
recognizing parental status in those with no biological or genetic ties. Yet,
within Illinois, the formalities of adoption and marriage reign despite the
ever-rising numbers of cohabitating, unwed couples or grandparents who
raise children outside adoption. Even express private contracts regarding
childcare seem insufficient, as Illinois is one of only a few American states
233generally refusing to enforce cohabitation agreements.
As for nonparent childcare interests over parental objections in other
states, consider the rather broad South Dakota statute allowing
any person other than the parent of a child to intervene or
petition a court ... for custody or visitation of any child
with whom he or she has served as a primary caretaker, has
closely bonded as a parental figure, or has otherwise
formed a significant and substantial relationship.
234
In South Dakota, "[a] parent's presumptive right to custody" is lost when
there is abandonment or persistent neglect; forfeiture or surrender of paren-
tal rights to a nonparent; abdication of "parental rights and responsibilities";
or "extraordinary circumstances" where parental custody "would result in
232. Certain nonparents may not have both custody and visitation opportunities. See,
e.g., Morris v. Morris, 710 S.E.2d 601, 603 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011) (under Georgia Code 19-7-1
and 19-7-3, aunts have custody, but not visitation, opportunities).
233. Natalie T. Lorenz, Cohabitation Agreements After the Civil Union Act, ILL. B.J.,
June 2012, at 308, 308. Illinois policy, founded on Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1209
(Ill. 1979), is opined to be outdated in light of the Civil Union Act's explicit recognition of
family units outside of marriage. But see, e.g., Costa v. Oliven, 849 N.E.2d 122, 123-25 (111.
App. Ct. 2006) (refusing to reject Hewitt due to recent "legislative activity and changes in
social and judicial attitudes," while emphasizing "it is for the legislature and not the courts to
bring about that change"). Yet, there is some Illinois precedent supporting a former steppar-
ent's contractual right to childrear over parental objection via the equitable estoppel doc-
trine; at least where there is harm to the child, an earlier agreement by the parent to allow a
former stepparent an opportunity for child visitation, reasonable reliance by the former step-
parent on the agreement, and a detrimental "change" to the former stepparent's position as a
result of the agreement. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Engelkens, 821 N.E.2d 799, 806 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2004). Equitable estoppel is more readily available when the agreement becomes
part of a court order, as in In re Marriage of Schlam, 648 N.E.2d 345, 348 (Ill. App. Ct.
1995).
234. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-29. Thus, not all de facto parents can qualify as de
facto custodians with standing to seek childcare orders. See, e.g., Truman v. Lillard, No.
2012-CA-000160-ME, 2012 WL 5372121 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 2, 2012) (former same-sex
partner of woman who adopted her niece was not a de facto custodian, and failed to show a
waiver of superior parental right to custody).
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serious detriment to the child."235 In Kentucky, a "'de facto custodian"' of a
child can seek custody if he or she was "the primary caregiver" and "finan-
cial supporter," he or she resided with the child for at least six months, and
the child is under three.236 And in Colorado, there is nonparent standing to
seek an allocation of parental responsibilities when the nonparent "has had
the physical care of a child for a period of six months or more."
237
Elsewhere, there are special statutes on court orders involving child-
care by stepparents (both present and former) that, unlike Illinois, do not
require a child at least twelve years old, a marriage of at least five years,
and a custodial parent unable to "perform the duties of a parent to the
child., 238 For example, in a Tennessee divorce, "a stepparent to a minor
child bom to the other party... may be granted reasonable visitation rights
... upon a finding that such visitation rights would be in the best interests
of the minor child and that such stepparent is actually providing or contrib-
235. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-29(l)-(4). The statute was applied to permit visita-
tion favoring a man with no biological or adoptive ties. Clough v. Nez, 759 N.W.2d 297
(S.D. 2008). See also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 25-5-33 (parent can be ordered to pay child sup-
port to nonparent having "custodial rights").
236. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270 (residence for at least one year is required if the
child is older than three). Thus, not all de facto parents can qualify as de facto custodians
with standing to seek childcare. See, e.g., Truman v. Lillard, No. 2012-CA-000160-ME,
2012 WL 5372121 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 2, 2012) (former same-sex partner of woman who
adopted her niece was not a de facto custodian and failed to show a waiver of superior pa-
rental right to custody); Spreacker v. Vaughn, 2011-CA-00201 1-ME, 2012 WL 5970232
(Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2012) (paternal great aunt is de facto custodian). There are similar
laws in Indiana, K.S. v. B.W., 945 N.E.2d 1050 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (employing Indiana
Code 31-9-2-35.5), and Minnesota, MINN. STAT. § 257c.03(2) ("de facto custodian"). The
phrase "de facto custodian," and similar phrases, can also be used in other settings. See, e.g.,
In re Jesse C., No. C069325, 2012 WL 5902301 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2012) (de facto
parent is one who cares for child during dependency proceeding; de facto parent status is lost
when dependency is terminated).
237. COLO. REv. STAT. § 14-10-123(1)(c). See, e.g., In re B.B.O., 277 P.3d 818
(Colo. 2012) (half-sister has standing); In re D.T., No. 1 CA1006, 2012 WL 3755608 (Col.
Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2012) (mother's friend did not gain standing as she "served more of a
grandmotherly role, rather than a parental role" and as mother never ceded her parental
rights).
238. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/601 (c)-(A)-(C). Other requirements for stepparent
childcare in Illinois include, inter alia, five year residence of the parent and stepparent, the
child's desire to live with the stepparent, and the child's best interests. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/601(B), (E), (F). Beside special statutes, there are some common law rights regarding
childcare for some former stepparents. See, e.g., Bethany v. Jones, 378 S.W.3d 731 (Ark.
2011) (former lesbian partner obtains child visitation order; court relies on Robinson v.
Ford-Robinson, 208 S.W.3d 140 (Ark. 2005), where stepmother was able to seek visitation
with stepson over father's objection as long as visitation was in the child's "best interest").
Special stepparent childcare laws, of course, may be coupled with special stepparent adop-
tion laws. See, e.g., LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1252(A) (no need for even limited home
studies in some stepparent adoptions); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 42-4-302(l)(a) (stepparent has
lived with child and a parent with legal and physical custody for past sixty days).
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uting towards the support of such child., 239 In California, "reasonable visit-
ation to a stepparent" is permitted if "in the best interest of the minor
child., 240 In Wisconsin, a stepparent (as well as a grandparent and others)
can petition for "reasonable visitation rights" if a court determines that vi s-
itation is in the child's best interests and if there is a preexisting "relation-
ship similar to a parent-child relationship with the child."24' In Oregon,
during a dissolution proceeding, a stepparent can obtain custody or visita-
tion by proving that "a child-parent relationship exists," that the presump-
tion that the parent acts in the child's best interest has been "rebutted by a
preponderance of the evidence," and that the child's "best interest" will be
served.242 If a stepparent only proves "an ongoing personal relationship"
with the child, the parental presumption must be rebutted by "clear and
convincing evidence. 243 In Utah, a former "stepparent"244can pursue child
custody or visitation in a divorce or "other proceeding" 245 through showing
by "clear and convincing evidence" that, inter alia, the stepparent "inten-
tionally assumed the role and obligations of a parent"; formed "an emotion-
al bond and created a parent-child type relationship"; contributed to the
"child's wellbeing"; and showed the parent is "absent" or has "abused or
neglected the child.' 246 In Delaware, "upon the death or disability of the
custodial or primary placement parent," a stepparent who resided with the
deceased or disabled parent can request custody even if "there is a surviving
natural parent., 247 And in Virginia, a former stepparent with a "legitimate
interest ' '248 can secure custody of or visitation with a child "upon a showing
by clear and convincing evidence that the best interest of the child would be
served thereby.,
249
239. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-303 (for use of questionable facial validity under
Troxel without any showings as to, for example, parental acts or child detriment).
240. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3101.
241. WIS. STAT. § 767.43(1). There are other special guidelines for grandparents who
petition. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 767.43(3) (no earlier adoption of child and the child is a
nonmarital child whose parents never married).
242. OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119(3)(a). "Child-parent relationship" means a relation-
ship, within the past six months, "that fulfilled the child's psychological needs for a parent
as well as the child's physical needs." OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119(10)(a).
243. OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119(3)(b). An "ongoing personal relationship means a
relationship with substantial continuity for at least one year, through interaction, companion-
ship, interplay and mutuality." OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119(l0)(e).
244. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5a-102(2)(e) (West 2012).
245. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5a-103(4) (West 2012).
246. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5a-103(2) (West 2012).
247. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 733 (West 2012).
248. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.1 (West 2012).
249. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2 (West 2012). See, e.g., Brown v. Burch, 519 S.E.2d
403, 412 (Va. Ct. App. 1999) (holding, over mother's objection, "clear and convincing evi-
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Besides statutes, there are case precedents recognizing childcare inter-
ests in nonparents who have acted like parents but who are not designated
as parents under law. For example, in Ohio, there can be no "shared parent-
ing" contracts between parents and nonparents.2 However, "a parent may
voluntarily share with a nonparent the care, custody, and control of his or
her child through a valid shared-custody agreement," which may create for
a nonparent "an agreement for permanent shared legal custody of the par-
ent's child" or an agreement for temporary shared legal custody, like when
the agreement is revocable by the parent. In Minnesota, under certain
conditions, there is a common law right to visitation over parental objection
for a former stepparent or an aunt who stood "in loco parentis" with the
child.252 And in New York, a grandparent has standing to seek visitation
with a grandchild over parental objection when "conditions exist which
equity would see fit to intervene. 253
C. CONTINGENT OR RESURRECTED CHILDCARE RIGHTS
Though in Mancine Nicholas had no unconditional childcare interests
in William (or Elizabeth) upon divorce, might Nicholas nevertheless later
be afforded contingent or resurrected interests, even without any adoption,
guardianship, foster care placement, or the like? What if Miki died or
placed William (or Elizabeth) up for adoption a day after the divorce?
Then, there would be no one with superior parental rights regarding Wil-
liam, and William's (and Elizabeth's) 254 best interests might be well served
by permitting Nicholas to childcare. Here, a de facto (or comparable)
dence of special and unique circumstances" justify joint custody order favoring father and
former stepfather, with the latter "retaining physical custody of the boy").
250. In re Bonfield, 780 N.E.2d 241 (Ohio 2002).
251. In re Mullen, 953 N.E.2d 302, 306 (Ohio 2011). Custody in the nonparent is
only allowed under an agreement when the juvenile court deems the nonparent suitable and
the shared custody is in the best interests of the child. Bonfield, 953 N.E.2d at 312-13; see
also In re LaPiana, Nos. 93691, 93692, 2010 WL 3042394 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2010)
(holding former lesbian partner secures visitation with two children born of assisted repro-
duction, where there is a written agreement to raise jointly the first child and other evidence
of intent to share custody of both children).
252. Rohmiller v. Hart, 811 N.W.2d 585, 593 (Minn. 2012).
253. In re Van Nostrand, 925 N.Y.S.2d 229, 230 (App. Div. 2011) (citing Domestic
Relations Law §72[1]). See also In re Victoria, 208 Md. 87, 106-07 (2012) (holding sibling
visitations can be ordered over parental objections only when standards for grandparent
visits have been met).
254. See, e.g., In re A.P.P., 251 P.3d 127, 129 (Mont. 2011) (recognizing parental
interest in stepfather after child's mother died, where substantial evidence established that
father "engaged in conduct contrary to the child-parent relationship").
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parenthood doctrine could be made contingent upon Miki's death or aban-
donment to adoption 25 via a special former stepparent statute."'
In an Illinois childcare proceeding today, upon a Miki's death, "a per-
son other than a parent" can seek custody of a William who "is not in the
physical custody of one of his parents. 257 Today, there is no special statute
(or presumption) favoring a former stepparent like Nicholas.2 58 But, there is
a statute mandating "visitation rights" for the grandparents, regardless of
255. Comparably, at times when a parent places a child for adoption with a certain
couple, that parent can later seek renewed custody if the adoption fails. Here, the termination
of parental rights is contingent. See, e.g., A.D.R. v. J.L.H., 994 So. 2d 177, 183 (Miss.
2008). As well, when a designated adopting person or couple (like the grandparents) die, at
times a parent may not be able to resurrect fully her superior rights, but might be given an
opportunity to reclaim custody, as upon a showing by clear and convincing evidence that
custody is in the child's best interests. See, e.g., D.M. v. D.R., 62 So. 3d 920 (Miss. 2011).
256. Note that not all parental abandonments necessarily mean the abandoning parent
has no further contacts with child. At times when parental interests are terminated, the ter-
minated parents may have significant opportunities for further contact when the children -
upon termination -must be considered for custody placement with "relatives." See, e.g., VA.
CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(A) (West 2012) (stating that a termination order should be followed
by a custody order which must give "consideration to granting custody to relatives of the
child, including grandparents"), applied in Bagley v. City of Richmond, Dep't of Soc. Serv.,
721 S.E.2d 21 (Va. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that immediate relatives do not include the
parents of the girlfriend of the natural mother's brother). Consider, as well, 705 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 405/1-5(2)(a) (State Bar Edition 2006) (stating that a previously appointed relative
caregiver interested in minor has a right to be heard in certain childcare proceedings involv-
ing the minor).
257. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/601(b)(2) (State Bar Edition 2005).
258. See, e.g., 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-3(a) (State Bar Edition 2005); 755 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/11-5(a), (a-I), (b) (2011) (stating guardianship qualifications when legal
parents are not available include a "best interest" test and no preference for a former step-
parent, or "de facto" parent, with perhaps some preference for one who is designated in
writing by a parent or parents as a guardian should the parent or parents die). Any special
statute need not necessarily grant standing to a former stepparent to seek a childcare order; it
may grant simply a right to be heard, with an opportunity to seek standing later in order to
pursue renewed custody/visitation. See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-5(2)(a) (State Bar
Edition 2006) (any "relative caregiver" "has the right to be heard" in a child neglect and
shelter proceeding, though not the right to be a party). For a review of American state laws
on parental testamentary appointments of child guardians, see Alyssa A. DiRusso & S. Kris-
ten Peters, Parental Testamentary Appointments of Guardians for Children, 25 QUINNIPIAC
PROB. L.J. 101 (2012), which urges statutory reforms so that parental wishes will more likely
be followed. Not only is there no special statute on former stepparents but also there are
times when former stepparents seem excluded from possible consideration for undertaking
the care of a former stepchild. See, e.g., 20 ILL. COMP STAT. 505/7(b) (State Bar Edition
2013) (stating that the Department of Children and Family Services may consider a child's
placement with a relative, who includes "the child's step-father, step-mother, or adult step-
brother or step-sister," but not a former step-father or step-mother).
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their earlier childcare, "unless it is shown that such visitation would be det-
rimental to the best interests and welfare of the minor.,
259
If Miki were to place William up for adoption a day after the divorce,
Nicholas's standing would not be recognized in Illinois today, as notice of a
placement for adoption is required only for "any person who is openly liv-
ing with the child or the child's mother at the time the proceeding is initiat-
ed and who is holding himself out to be the child's father., 260 So, if Miki
had a brand new boyfriend, he would have standing, but Nicholas would
not.261
Nicholas's failure to formally adopt William causes both Nicholas and
William to lose any chance to pursue a continuing familial relationship up-
on Miki's death or upon Miki's placement of William for adoption, regard-
less of William's best interest. Yet, in many parental rights termination
settings, bad acting parents get second chances, as where parent-child reuni-
fication obligations are imposed on the state and where there is no termina-
tion of parental rights unless a child's best interest is served.262 So, many
marginal parents maintain their superior rights notwithstanding their earlier
parenting failures and their children's contrary interests. But, many "de
facto" parents and their children have their families destroyed notwithstand-
259. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-7.1 (State Bar Edition 2012) ("[R]easonable visita-
tion rights may be granted to any other relative of the minor or other person having an inter-
est in the welfare of the child."). New grandparent visits also arise upon the death of a parent
when the grandparents had earlier secured visits during a marriage dissolution proceeding
and later seek to modify the divorce court order. See, e.g., Moreno v. Perez, 363 S.W.3d 725,
744 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011). By contrast, grandparents, upon the death of parents, can easily
acquire custody of their grandchildren via guardianship appointments when the deceased
parents provided for such custody in written instruments. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-5-
202.5 (West 2012) (stating that no notice is required to anyone before appointment becomes
effective), applied in In re T.D.G., 2012 UT 88, 29 P.3d 279 (2012) (Utah Sup. Ct. Standing
Order No. 4).
260. 750 ILL. COMP STAT. 50/7(c)(e) (State Bar Edition 2013). As there was a bap-
tism record, see also 750 ILL. COMP STAT. 50/7(c)(f) (State Bar Edition 2013) (stating that
notice is required to one "identified as the child's father by the mother in a written, sworn
statement"). As to the need for Nicholas's consent to any later adoption by another, consider
750 ILL. COMP STAT. 50/8(b)(vi) (State Bar Edition 2011) (stating that consent to adoption of
child over six months is required of "father" who "openly lived with the child" and "openly
held himself out to be the father of the child"), 750 ILL. COMP STAT. 50/8(a)(2) (State Bar
Edition 2011) (stating that consent is not required, however, when the father is neither "the
biological or adoptive father of the child"). Even if Nicholas's consent is deemed required
under this provision, the power to veto is undercut as there is no explicit duty to give Nicho-
las any notice.
261. It would be wrong to equate Miki and Nicholas here, as only Miki gave William
up for adoption. And, it is not necessarily true that William's best interests would be better
served by placement with Miki's new boyfriend rather than with Nicholas.
262. See, e.g., In re Destiny R., No. H12CP08011921A, 2011 WL 3930352, at *9
(Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 11, 2011).
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ing both unquestioned love and healthy familial relationships because for-
mal adoptions were not finalized.
The Proposed MDM Act recognizes some standing for current step-
parents, former stepparents, and others who childcared should a Miki die or
should a Miki place a William (or an Elizabeth) for adoption. However,
many significant caregivers remain without voices during the proposal's
hearing on "allocation of parental responsibilities., 263 The proposal recog-
nizes both a legal parent, defined as "a biological or adoptive parent,"
264
and an "equitable parent," defined as one who is not a legal parent but who
is obligated by court order to pay child support; is a stepparent; lived with
the child for at least two years and reasonably believed he or she was "the
child's biological parent"; or "lived with the child since the child's birth or
for at least 2 years, and held himself out as the child's parent ... under an
agreement with the child's legal parent" or legal parents.265 As a stepparent
includes one "who was married to a legal parent,"266 the Proposed Act
could help a Nicholas, as an "equitable parent," should a Miki die. The pro-
posal allows an equitable parent to file a petition for allocation of parental
responsibilities if "a legal parent is deceased or disabled and cannot per-
form caretaking functions with respect to the child. 2 67 At least as to an
Elizabeth, however, there seemingly is a living legal parent, a John
Mancine, if a Miki died, so that a Nicholas could not seek an allocation
regarding childcare.
Under the Proposed MDM Act, an equitable parent can also seek "an
allocation of parenting time" if the relationship between the equitable and
legal parent has ended or may end via a court case.268 Allocations of paren-
tal responsibilities involve more significant childcare opportunities than
allocations of parenting time.269 Seemingly, a Nicholas can seek an alloca-
263. Proposed MDM Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/601.2.
264. Proposed MDM Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/600.
265. Proposed MDM Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/600.
266. Proposed MDM Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/600.
267. Proposed MDM Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/601.2(b)(2).
268. Proposed MDM Act, 750 ILL. COMP STAT. 5/601.2(b)(3), with parenting time
defined in 750 ILL. COMP STAT. 5/600. As compared to parenting "responsibilities" or
"time," in Ohio noncustodial family members, including grandparents and other relatives,
may seek "reasonable companionship or visitation rights" when a related custodial parent
dies, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 3109.11 (West 2011), as long as Troxel limits are met, Oliver v.
Feldner, 776 N.E.2d 499, 509 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) (holding that Troxel limits were not
met); In re K.P.R., 966 N.E.2d 952, 956-57 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011) (holding that Troxel limits
may have been met where "relative" of deceased mother was a stepfather who was awarded
visitation, in a setting where the custodial biological father objected but had earlier waived
nonjurisdictional arguments regarding the visits).
269. Proposed MDM Act, 750 ILL. COMP STAT. 5/600 (parental responsibilities in-
clude both "parenting time" and "significant decision-making responsibilities with respect to
a child").
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tion of parenting time for a William (or an Elizabeth) under the proposal.
Yet, if he never married a Miki, a Nicholas would be barred because there
210was less than a two-year period of cohabitation.
Should a Miki die soon after divorce outside of Illinois, a Nicholas or
even a William Gansner, Nicholas's father and putative paternal grandfa-
ther, would fare better in seeking a childcare order. For example, if a Miki
died in Arizona, a Nicholas could obtain custody of an Elizabeth if he stood
"in loco parentis" to Elizabeth,27' if it would be "significantly detrimental"
to Elizabeth to be placed in John Mancine's custody,272 and if there is "clear
and convincing evidence that awarding custody" to John Mancine is not in
Elizabeth's "best interests. 273 A William Gansner could even obtain "rea-
sonable visitation rights" to Elizabeth in Arizona if he also stood "in loco
parentis" and visitation would serve Elizabeth's "best interests., 274 If a Miki
died in Utah,275 either a Nicholas or a William Gansner 276 could seek custo-
dy or visitation with a William (or an Elizabeth) by showing, inter alia,
intentional assumption of "the role and obligations of a parent"; "an emo-
tional bond" and "a parent-child type relationship"; emotional or financial
contribution to the child's well-being; and the child's best interests.277
As well, should a Miki place a William (or an Elizabeth) for adoption
outside of Illinois soon after divorce, a Nicholas or even Nicholas's father
would sometimes fare better, as where each is afforded preferential stand-
ing as a prospective adopter. In Utah, when a child is placed for adoption,
while a married, opposite sex couple is preferred, a child may be placed
270. Nicholas and Miki began cohabitating in September 2008, and Miki sought
marriage dissolution in August 2010. As well, Elizabeth already had two legal parents-
Miki and John Mancine. Compare MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-221 (West 2011), and MONT.
CODE ANN. § 40-4-211(6) (West 2011) (stating that "[u]pon death of a parent," a nonparent
who had established with the child a child-parent relationship can seek "a parenting plan
hearing"), with COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-123(l)(b), (c) (West 2012) (stating that a non-
parent can seek "allocation of parental responsibilities" if nonparent "has had the physical
care of a child" for more than 182 days, as long as action is commenced within 182 days
"after the termination of such physical care").
271. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-415(A)(1) (West 2013). This status is achieved by
being "treated as a parent by the child" and forming "a meaningful parental relationship with
the child for a substantial period of time."ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-415(G)(1) (West
2013).
272. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-415(A)(2) (West 2013).
273. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-415(B) (West 2013). If not custody, Nicholas could
be awarded "reasonable visitation" on a lesser showing. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-415(C)
(West 2013) ("in loco parentis" and "best interests").
274. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-415(C) (West 2013).
275. Miki's death would need to have her deemed "absent." UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-
5a-103(2)(g)(1) (West 2012).
276. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5a-102(2)(d), (e) (West 2012) (former step-parent and
step-grandparent).
277. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5a-103(2)(a), (b), (c), (e) (West 2012).
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After Mancine, a question lingers for Illinois legislators and judges:
"Is filial love something to be dangled and then snatched away, promised
and then reneged upon?, 27 9 The question is difficult; rules regarding "dan-
gled and snatched away" widgets are more challenging than rules regarding
"dangled and snatched away" children. Those with no natural or formal
adoptive ties who have developed "familial bonds" with children should
have childcare interests (and perhaps superior rights) not held by nonowner
widget users who have bonded with someone else's widgets. Additional
statutory guidelines on childcare interests for those with no natural or adop-
tive ties are necessary.280 As occurs in other family settings, like premarital
and open adoption pacts, 28 certain family-related agreements on childcare
deserve explicit statutory recognition.282 Expanded VAP and guardianship
278. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-117(4)(c) (West 2012). But see In re Adoption of
I.M., 288 P.3d 864, 869 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that former stepparent could not
adopt child via "second-parent adoption" afforded stepparent and that the court is reluctant
to allow adoption where statutory language is "clear and unambiguous").
279. In re Mullen, 953 N.E.2d 302, 311 (Ohio 2011) (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
280. The desirability of greater certainty and comprehensive coverage, as well as
separation of powers concerns, means these guidelines should normally originate in statutes.
See, e.g., Kitchen v. Kitchen, 953 N.E.2d 646, 649 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (rejecting visitation
standing in maternal aunt and uncle over father's objection where the mother had died, and
recognizing grandparent visitation standing has come by statute, former stepparent visitation
standing has come by precedent, and former foster parent visitation standing has been reject-
ed by precedent).
281. But see Bix, supra note 138, at 19 (recognizing that in all these areas, "a signifi-
cant part of the resistance to private ordering comes from legitimate concerns that courts and
legislatures have in protecting vulnerable parties, as well as reasonable worries regarding the
long-term societal effects of (encouraging) altered forms of marital or parental status"). One
example is PA. STAT. ANN. §2733(a) (West 2011) ("A prospective adoptive parent of a child
may enter into an agreement with a birth relative of the child to permit continuing contact or
communication between the child and the birth relative or between the adoptive parent and
the birth relative.").
282. In the absence of an express Illinois statute, agreements on child care between
parents and nonparents (including former stepparents, grandparents, former cohabitants, and
others-like aunts and uncles), the nonparents who wish to continue child care over parental
objections seemingly must utilize the narrow range of common law precedents on equitable
estoppel of the parents, deeming such agreements important, if not dispositive, where there
is shown detrimental reliance, earlier judicial recognition of the agreements, children's best
interests, and, perhaps, harm to children. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Engelkens, 821 N.E.2d
799, 804, 806 (I11. App. Ct. 2004) (distinguishing In re Marriage of Schlam, 648 N.E.2d 345
(I11. App. Ct. 1995)).
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opportunities should also be available to establish new avenues of child-
care.
Childcare interests should sometimes be recognized as though there
were no formal or informal contracts or VAPs, at least when the legal par-
ent(s) facilitated familial bonds and when bond preservation furthers the
child's best, or perhaps compelling, interest, even over the objection of the
legal parent(s).283 Preservation of familial bonds can be secured through
either expanded definitions of legal parenthood or expanded opportunities
for judicially-monitored childcare by nonparents. The Proposed Parentage
Act and Proposed MDM Act are steps in the right direction. But even with
their enactments, more statutory law (and some common law) will be need-
ed to promote additional "familial love" for deserving children and all who
care for them. Beyond these proposals, the General Assembly should ad-
dress a broader array of "established familial or family-like bonds, 284 or
allow expressly authorized judicial action, as courts will often "decline to
go where the legislature has not led.,
285
283. See, e.g., Sides v. Ikner, 730 S.E.2d 844, 853-54 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (holding
that there is a need to look at legal parents' conduct and intentions, not just nonparent acts,
to insure protection of rights emanating from "paramount parental status").
284. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 88 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
285. In re Adoption of A.W., 796 N.E.2d 729, 736 (II1. App. Ct. 2003).
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